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INTRODUCTION

In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America' the United States
Supreme Court upheld Indiana's takeover statute as constitutional,
reversing the view of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit that the statute was preempted by the Williams
Act and was an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.2 A
large number of states have enacted takeover statutes as part of
their corporate law. These statutes, designed to regulate the market for corporate control, are of different types and represent several models. Some of them provide for collective shareholder voting or increased shareholders' rights in a takeover, whereas others
increase the power of management faced with a hostile takeover. If
these statutes are constitutional, hostile takeovers will be limited
and the market for corporate control will be adversely affected.
The Court's ruling in CTS Corp. did not explicitly validate all
state takeover statutes. This Article examines the opinion in CTS
Corp. and discusses its implications for other state takeover statutes. In addition, this Article discusses the role of the state in the
market for corporate control.
The Article begins by exploring the background of the controversy and the various statutory models enacted. Next, the Article
reviews the opinion in CTS Corp. and discusses its future implications for the statutory models in light of the Court's preemption
and commerce clause analyses. Although the Court's preemption
discussion in CTS Corp. focused on the role of state law in protect1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
2. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
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ing investors and enhancing the role of the shareholders, this Article addresses whether state law must perform that function to
avoid preemption. In addition, the Court's commerce clause analysis emphasized the role of the state of incorporation in providing
corporate governance rules. The Article discusses whether those
rules must benefit shareholders and whether states other than the
state of incorporation have a role to play.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Hostile Takeovers

A hostile takeover occurs when an outside party seeks control of
a corporation despite opposition from the target corporation's
management. Such takeovers have generated a considerable
amount of legal, political, and economic debate. Proponents of hostile takeovers adopt the thesis that competition from the market
for corporate control should be encouraged and facilitated.' This
market for corporate control theory builds on the efficient market
theory, which assumes that by using all available information, the
trading markets work efficiently to price stocks accurately to represent the true value of a corporation.4 For example, management, which often has a small equity interest in the corporation,
may manage the corporation inefficiently or may be motivated by
self-interest. Accordingly, incumbent management's failure to maximize the value of a corporation will be reflected in the price of its
stock. Such a failure can attract an offeror to offer a premium to
shareholders for a controlling interest, in the belief that it can operate the corporation more efficiently. Thus, the market for corporate control provides a premium that benefits the corporation's

3. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Manne, Mergers and
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
4. See J. LoRiE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET, THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97
(1973). See also Note, The Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). But see Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 274-76 (1983).
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shareholders, replaces incompetent management, and shifts corporate assets to more efficient use.'
The opponents of hostile takeovers vary from those who argue
that takeovers are harmful to shareholders to some who argue they
are harmful to other corporate constituencies and the economy as
a whole. 6 Some critics question the underlying studies of the efficient market theory by pointing out anomalies in the market.7
Others argue that although the trading markets may be efficient in
the daily pricing of securities, such pricing does not reflect the
value of the enterprise.8 Moreover, critics are concerned that in reality, takeovers are aimed not at inefficient companies, but at wellrun ones. The fear is that hostile takeovers divert management's
attention from long-run performance to short-term profit making.'
Others assert that the impact of takeovers on employees and the
communities served may be detrimental and that the mere reshuffling of assets does not produce any real economic gains. Moreover,
some critics contend that the increased use of debt financing in
hostile takeovers may lead to severe economic problems during a
recession which could adversely affect both local and national
economies.' 0

5. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1173-74; Fischel, Efficient Capital Market
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
Tix. L. REv. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978); Manne, supra note 3.
6. See generally Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism,136
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1987).
7. See Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1985); Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is
Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 341 (1986).
8. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 274-76.
9. Critics of hostile takeovers often argue that the market does not reflect management's
concern for investing in the long term for the corporation but seeks out short-term results.
Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism,Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1986, at 32, col. 1. This argument has

been criticized as an unrealistic view of the functioning of the market which values both
short-term and long-term profits. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 18 n.46 (1986). Even if the
market values securities by taking into account all available public information, those traders are not necessarily pursuing a sound economic policy. See Margotta, Distorting Corporate Investment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, at F2, col. 3.
10. For example, in enacting New York's takeover statute, the Governor, who proposed

the bill, stated that the law would "promote the long-term growth of New York resident
domestic corporations." Statement of Governor Cuomo on approving L.1985, c.915 (Dec. 16,
1985), reprinted in 2 McKINNEY'S 1985 SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK 3339. See also Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 109-10 (1979).
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Both the acquisition techniques utilized by offerors and the defensive strategies employed by management of the target corporation continue to evolve. One court has described the scene as

follows:
Contests for corporate control have become ever more frequent
phenomena on the American business scene. Waged with the intensity of military campaigns and the weaponry of seemingly
bottomless bankrolls, these battles determine the destinies of
large and small corporations alike. Elaborate strategies and ingenious tactics have been developed both to facilitate takeover attempts and to defend against them. Skirmishes are fought in
company boardrooms, in shareholders' meetings, and, with increasing regularity, in the courts. 1
The rise of hostile takeovers has prompted legislative responses.
In 1968, the United States Congress responded with the Williams
Act, 12 which was designed to protect investors by requiring both
disclosure of material information 3 and adherence to procedural
rules that provide targets sufficient time to determine whether to
accept a tender offer.' 4
11. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984). The terms used

to describe the tactics are as colorful and creative as the tactics themselves. For example,
shark repellents are preventive measures devised to make takeovers procedurally difficult.
They may include changing the articles of incorporation or bylaws to provide for staggered
terms of office for directors, requiring a "supermajority" vote to approve any hostile takeover bid, barring front-end-loaded offers, concentrating voting power in a class of closely
held common stock, or issuing new classes of stock. Reiser, Corporate Takeovers: A Glossary of Terms and Tactics, 89 CASE & COM., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 35, 50.
12. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
13. For example, a tender offeror is required to file a disclosure statement that includes
such information as the offeror's background and identity, the source and amount of the
funds to be used in making the purchase, the purpose of the purchase, including any plans
to liquidate the company or make major changes in its corporate structure, and the extent
of the offeror's holdings in the target company. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(1) (incorporating §
78m(d)(1)) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13 d-1, 240.14d-3 (1987).
14. For example, tendering stockholders may withdraw their shares during the first 7 days
of the tender offer and, if the offeror has not purchased their shares, any time after 60 days
from commencement of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1986).
The tender offer must remain open for at least 20 business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a).
When the number of shares tendered exceeds the number that the offeror sought to
purchase, the offeror must purchase on a pro rata basis from each tendering shareholder. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8. Lastly, the tender offeror is required to pay the
same price for all purchases, and if the offering price is increased before the end of the offer,
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The states also responded to hostile takeovers by enacting legislation described as first-generation takeover statutes.1" Their purpose was often to provide target corporation management with additional defenses to delay or even halt a tender offer. The
legislatures believed that they were protecting local industry and
investors from the disruptions of a hostile offer.' 6 However, others
believe that the legislatures were acting out of parochial economic
7
interests by protecting incumbent management.1
B.

Edgar v. MITE Corp.

Typical of the first-generation statutes was the Illinois law
struck down by the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.'" The
statute provided that the Secretary of State could hold a hearing
to consider the fairness of certain tender offers and whether the
offeror had made a full and fair disclosure. The Secretary of State
was also empowered to enjoin a tender offer nationwide. 9 For its
provisions to apply, the statute required either that the corporation have ten percent of its shareholders in Illinois or that it meet
two of the three following conditions: that its principal executive
offices were located in Illinois; that it was incorporated in Illinois;
or that ten percent of the corporation's stated capital or paid-in
surplus was situated in Illinois2 0 Opponents contended that these
requirements unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce
and that the Williams Act preempted the legislation.
The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
those who have tendered must receive the benefit of the increased price. See 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(7).
15. Most of the 37 states that enacted the first generation takeover statutes did so after
the Williams Act. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (1982). Although Virginia had
a statute dealing with tender offers prior to the Williams Act, there is no evidence that
Congress considered the Virginia statute when passing the Williams Act. Id.
16. Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40
Bus. LAW. 671, 674 (1985).
17. E.g., Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D. Ind. 1978) ("delay increases the
risks that the offer will not be successful by ... granting ... incumbent management [the

time] to take various steps in an effort to frustrate the successful completion of the tender
offer").
18. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion).
19. Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, paras. 137.51-.70 (1982)
(repealed 1983).
20. Id.
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...
[to regulate Commerce . . .among the several States."21 The
clause does not explicitly restrict state regulation of commerce; instead, the constitutional limitations on state regulation of interstate activities flow from Congress's unexercised commerce clause
power.22 Under the so-called dormant commerce clause analysis,
the Court attempts to distinguish between direct and indirect state
regulation and will strike down a law that regulates interstate commerce directly, discriminates against interstate commerce, or favors intrastate economic interests over out-of-state interests.2 3 An
indirect and nondiscriminatory statute is subjected to a balancing
test and is upheld if it "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental. . . unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
'
benefits."24
The Supreme Court in Edgar found that the statute was an "indirect burden" on interstate commerce, excessive in relation to its
benefits, and therefore unconstitutional. 5 Specifically, the Court's

21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 230 (11th ed. 1985). The "great silences" of the

Constitution have given the Supreme Court power to determine the role of the states in
regulating interstate commerce. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535
(1949).
23. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986). Professor Tribe indicates that the direct-indirect distinction is conclusory and
misleading and that in its place the Court has substituted a more indeterminate principle.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 408 (2d ed. 1988). The Court will uphold a state

regulation if it is rationally related to a legitimate state end and the burden imposed on
interstate commerce and any resulting discrimination are outweighed by the state's interest
in enforcing the regulation. Id. at 408-09. The Court appears to recognize the difficulty in
distinguishing between direct and indirect burden but still uses the distinction. See BrownForman, 476 U.S. at 579-80.
24. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See generally Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986) (the Court should be concerned solely with purposeful economic
protectionism and should abandon the balancing test). See also Justice Scalia's concurrence
in CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643. A plurality of four Justices found the Illinois statute to be a
direct burden on interstate commerce and therefore invalid. Id. The plurality found the
statute to be a direct burden because it could preclude the offeror from engaging in interstate commerce with shareholders who were residents of another state. Id. at 642. The plurality was concerned that other states could impose similar regulations that would stifle
interstate tender offers. The Court indicated that a statute whose application took place

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:699

analysis of the burden focused on the statute's interference with
the market for corporate control. The Court noted that the Illinois
statute's frustration of hostile tender offers was substantial in several respects. First, shareholders lost an opportunity to tender
their shares at a premium.2 6 Second, the statute impeded reallocation of economic resources to their higher value.27 Third, the law
diminished an incentive for management to run the corporation efficiently and to keep the stock price high."'
The state claimed that the Illinois legislation protected resident
shareholders. The Court noted, however, that "[w]hile protecting
local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has
'
no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders." 29
The statute exempted self tenders, however, leaving the Illinois
shareholders without the protection of the statute. This underinclusiveness undermined the state's argument that the purpose of
the statute was shareholder protection. Furthermore, many of the
statute's provisions also paralleled the Williams Act requirements,
a redundancy that further limited the claimed benefit of investor
protection. 30

wholly outside a state, even if it had effects within the state, was not permissible. Id. at 64243. The Court also noted that it would look to whether the practical effect of the regulation
reached beyond the state. Id. at 643 (citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945)).
26. Id. at 643. Although shareholders generally receive more than the current market
price, not all shareholders may in fact benefit from the premium compared to the value of
the shares after a thwarted tender offer. Lipton, supra note 10. But see F. EASTERBROOK &
G. JARRELL, REPORT OF REcOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEC's ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER

OFFERS 48-49 (July 8, 1983) (dissenting statements).
27. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643. Again, the shareholders of the offeror may not benefit automatically by an acquisition. Studies have indicated that acquiring companies are not benefiting their own shareholders with tender offers. See, e.g., Scherer, Takeovers: Present and
Future Dangers, BROOKINGs REV., Winter/Spring 1986, at 15. In both micro- and macroeconomic terms, the verdict is still out on the benefits of hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Coffee,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
28. Edgar,457 U.S. at 643. Although the trading markets generally are efficient, the price
of a corporation's stock on a given day may not reflect the intrinsic value of the corporation
or its value in the acquisitions market. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
29. Id. at 644. The Court in CTS Corp. appeared to limit this broad statement as being
applicable to nonresident corporations. See CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52, and infra text
accompanying notes 267-70.
30. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 644-45. Lower federal courts have taken a different view of state
statutes that parallel the Williams Act. See, e.g., Cardiff Acquisitions v. Hatch, 751 F.2d
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Illinois also contended that its interest in regulating the internal
affairs of firms incorporated in that state justified the statute.31
The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle suggesting that the law of the state of incorporation should govern
intracorporate relationships involving the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders.32 With the use of a single law,
the doctrine attempts to prevent conflicting demands from several
states and to encourage convenience and predictability of legal
application. 3
The Court did not address the interplay between the internal
affairs doctrine and the commerce clause because it concluded that
the doctrine was inapplicable.34 First, the Court dismissed the use
of the doctrine because the Illinois statute could have applied to
corporations that were not incorporated in Illinois and whose principal place of business might be elsewhere.3 5 In addition, the Court
noted that tender offers involve the transfer of shares between
shareholders, a transaction that does not generally implicate the
36
internal affairs doctrine.
Although the majority in Edgar did not find that the Illinois
statute was preempted by the Williams Act, two Justices joined
Justice White's plurality opinion that preemption existed.37 The issue of preemption arises under the supremacy clause of the Constitution" when Congress has exercised its exclusive power to regulate in an area in which the states have also regulated. Because
906, 911-12 (8th Cir. 1984) (the duplication may be beneficial, given the limited resources of
the SEC to enforce its rules). But ef. National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 113132 (8th Cir. 1982) (additional disclosure "'may accomplish more harm than good' by confusing shareholders") (quoting TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)).
31. Edgar,457 U.S. at 645.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 302 (1969). When a state other
than the state of incorporation has a more significant relationship to a particular issue and
to the parties, its law will apply. Id. § 302(2). This may result in some problems with the
fourth-generation state takeover statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 261-300.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 comment b.
34. Edgar,457 U.S. at 645-46.
35. Id. The Court stated that "Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of
foreign corporations." Id. This statement raises significant questions concerning the ability
of states to impose their laws on foreign corporations. See infra pt. IV.B.1.b.

36. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645. See infra note 261.
37. Edgar,457 U.S. at 630-40. Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion and Justice Black-

mun concurred. Id. at 625.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Congress has specifically permitted state securities regulation
under section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act,3 9 the only
issue under the Illinois statute was whether "compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . ." or
whether the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
' 40
Congress.
Conceivably, a corporation could comply with both the Illinois
statute and the Williams Act. Thus the issue addressed in Edgar
was whether the statute frustrated the purposes of the federal law.
Justice White, in his plurality opinion, stated that Congress intended a policy of neutrality in hostile tender offers between the
offeror and incumbent management.4 1 Three of the statutory provisions conflicted with the purpose of the Williams Act by upsetting the "careful balance struck by Congress. ' 42 First, the Illinois
statute provided a twenty-day precommencement period during
which management could present its views while the offeror was
precluded from publishing the offer. 43 The court found this to be a
"powerful tool to combat tender offers" that frustrated the purposes of the Williams Act, especially since Congress had deleted
precommencement notice provisions from an earlier draft of the
Act.44 Second, because the hearing provisions within the statute
failed to set a deadline, management could "stymie . . . a takeover" indefinitely. 45 This delay upset Congressional intent to per39. Section 28 permits state regulation that does not conflict with the Act. 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(a) (1982).
40. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 631 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 633. This policy of neutrality favors a market approach to tender offers. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in a case prior
to Edgar. The court noted that "[i]nstead of relying upon investors' decisions after full
disclosure, Idaho relies upon the business judgment of corporate directors with a fiduciary
duty to their shareholders. Idaho's 'fiduciary approach' to investor protection may be one
way to protect shareholders, but it is an approach Congress rejected." Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub. noma.
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
42. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 634.
43. Id. at 634-35.
44. Id. at 635. Delays provided by the timing requirements of some statutes can be viewed
as interfering with the timing requirements of the Williams Act. See Canadian Pac. Enters.
(U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
45. Id. at 637 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub.
nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)). In CTS Corp. the Court indicated that

1988]

STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

mit tender offers to go forward without delay. Finally, the statute's
requirement that the Secretary of State review the fairness of the
tender offer conflicted with investor autonomy.4
C.

The Next Generationsof Statutes

The majority opinion in Edgar recognized the burdens of restricting the market for corporate control by finding that the Illinois statute's interference with hostile tender offers created a burden on interstate commerce because it precluded the benefits of
that market to shareholders and the economy. The majority opinion, however, did not preclude states from enacting statutes when
those states had an interest greater than Illinois had in Edgar.If a
majority of the Court ever accepts the neutrality view in Justice
White's preemption argument, the role of the states in the market
for corporate control would be severely limited because the delays
created would often favor management. 7
After Edgar many of the states either enacted new statutes or
amended their takeover statutes in an attempt to survive constitutional attack.48 The legislators attempted to distinguish their statutes from the Illinois statute and established a greater state interest by using the state of incorporation test, requiring some assets,
offices, and shareholders in the state, and providing a regulatory
format that was enabling and similar to other corporate governance statutes.
State statutes that affect the tender offer process can be described as the second-generation takeover statutes. They include
the shareholder approval, second-tier, share redemption, fiduciary

some delays created by state law are permissible. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1647. See infra
text accompanying notes 184-196.
46. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639-40. Although fairness considerations have long been a part of
blue sky regulations, those statutes generally apply only to shareholders in the particular
state. See id. at 641; T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcunrriEs REGULATION 221-22 (1985).
47. See Note, The Constitutionalityof Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REv. 203, 227-29 (1987).
48. See generally Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing
Pat, Blue Sky, or CorporationLaw Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REv. 3 (1984) (after Edgar v.
MITE Corp., states can adopt three basic approaches to tender offer regulation: attempt to
continue enforcing existing law, adopt laws predicated on a blue sky jurisdictional model, or
adopt laws predicated on a corporate law jurisdictional model); Warren, supra note 16.
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duty, and full-disclosure models. 49 Those statutes that allow the
completion of the tender offer but severely limit the offeror's rights
in the corporation can be described as third-generation takeover
statutes. They include the voting rights and business combination
models.
In order to avoid the reach of the Edgar opinion, the secondand third-generation statutes required that the corporation be incorporated in the state. They also required some resident shareholders and the location of the principal executive offices or significant assets in the state5 0 Often the legislation permitted
corporations to either opt out of or opt into the statutory requirements and did not involve the state's administrative authority at
all .5 Recently, state legislatures have enacted some of these statutory models to apply to foreign corporations that have a significant
number of assets and shareholders in the state. This new generation of statutes can be described as the fourth generation of
statutes.
1. The Second-Generation Statutes
First enacted in Ohio, the shareholder approval model requires a
vote of the disinterested shareholders to approve the acquisition of
shares at specific thresholds.52 This type of statute treats the
tender offer like any other corporate acquisition that ordinarily requires a shareholder vote. 3
49. See Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Corporate
MIAMI L. REv. 473 (1987).
50. These requirements apparently are attempts to create a stronger nexus to a state to
justify the burdens imposed by the regulation. In addition, the regulation may purport to
take precedence over a conflicting statutory provisions in another state. See infra text accompanying notes 240-260.
51. The full-disclosure model, however, often involves a state agency in enforcing the
statutes and promulgating rules. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-13 (McKinney 1986).
See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
52. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985). The Ohio Takeover Act applies to
corporations incorporated in Ohio when the corporation has 50 or more resident shareholders and its principal place of business, principal executive offices, or substantial assets are
located in Ohio. Id. § 1701.01(Y). The act established three thresholds for shareholder voting on acquisitions of one-fifth to less than one-third of the voting power, one-third to less
than a majority, or a majority or more. Id. § 1701.01(Z)(1).
53. See generally Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 108 (1983). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the

Law, 41 U.
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The second-tier model is concerned with the effect of a frontloaded two-tier tender offer on the target's shareholders. Such an
offer involves a tender offer for a sufficient number of shares to
gain control of the corporation at a higher price than will be offered to the shareholders in a follow-up freezeout transaction. This
freezeout transaction often involves a merger with the controlling
shareholders acquiring complete control of the corporation and the
remaining minority shareholders receiving cash. 4 The strategy has
been criticized for being coercive because it forces shareholders to
tender for the higher price in the tender offer to minimize the impact of the lower priced freezeout transaction. 5 The second-tier
model assures the shareholders of either a disinterested
supermajority vote on the freezeout transaction or a fair price after
the tender offer when the offeror, now in control of the corporation, proposes to freeze out the remaining shareholders. 6
The share redemption model requires any shareholder who acquires a certain percentage of stock to buy out the remaining
shareholders at "fair value. '57 This model avoids the problem of
Ohio statute unconstitutional on preemption and commerce clause grounds. Fleet Aerospace
Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace
Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to
the court of appeals for further consideration in light of the CTS Corp. decision.
54. See Comment, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 928-29 (1985). The shareholders who
are in a minority position usually must accept the payment offered or seek appraisal. Appraisal often is not a viable alternative because it is time consuming and uncertain.
55. In CTS Corp., the Supreme Court specifically noted that the Indiana statute's attempt to minimize the impact of coercive two-tier tender offers was a valid basis for upholding the law against the preemption challenge. CTS Corp. 107 S. Ct. at 1646 (citing Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 307-09).
56. See, e.g., MD.CORPS & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603, 8-301(14) (1985). See generally Romano, The PoliticalEconomy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111 (1987) (the
statute requires business combinations with interested shareholders to be approved by a
supermajority vote unless the transaction is approved by a disinterested board or the terms
of the combination essentially equal the higher of the highest price the interested- party paid
for the shares or the current market price).
57. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN, § 1910 (Purdon 1986) (fair price determined in a
manner comparable to that of other appraisal proceedings, but any premium the offeror
paid is also considered); Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania ShareholderProtectionAct:
A New State Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. LAw. 111, 115
(1984). Fair value could be determined by appraisal in the share redemption model to be
greater than the amount offered in the first tier.
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two-tier front-loaded takeovers and provides an equal opportunity
,for all shareholders to receive a fair price. 8
The fiduciary duty model expands the concept of fiduciary duty
to include consideration of interests other than those of shareholders when the corporate directors are acting.5 9 This model may limit
successful actions against directors who employ defensive tactics to
thwart a tender offer.6 0 In some cases the statute specifically condones directors looking out for the long-term as opposed to shortterm interests of the corporations."
The full-disclosure model requires that information in addition
to that required by the Williams Act be given to the shareholders
of a specific state, 2 including information about the tender offer's
impact on that state. These statutes are similar to the states' blue

58. A similar rule is provided in Great Britain to protect investors in takeovers. After the
offering corporation acquires 30%, the other shareholders are entitled to equal opportunity.
DeMott, CurrentIssues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons From the British, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 945, 960 (1983).
59. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987). The statute
provides:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors,
committees of the board, and individual directors may, in considering the best
interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees,
upon suppliers and customers of the corporation and upon communities in
which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located, and all
other pertinent factors.
Id.
60. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (Anderson 1986), which provides that
proof of breach of the duty of care requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. In
addition the director will be liable for damages only if there was a deliberate intent to cause
injury or a reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation. Id. § 1701.59(D). A
considerable amount of legislation has been enacted to deal generally with the potential
liability of outside directors for breaches of fiduciary duty that have an effect on tender
offers but were not designed solely to deal with that issue. See infra note 176.
61. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(4).
62. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1600-13 (McKinney 1986); 1984 Minn. Sess. Law
Serv. 448 (West). The New York statute provides in part:
(c) "Offeree" means the beneficial owner, residing in this state, of securities
which an offeror acquires or offers to acquire in connection with a takeover bid.
(d) "Target company" means a corporation, organized under the laws of this
state and having its principal executive offices or significant business operations located within this state.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(c)-(d).
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sky regulations because a failure to comply usually precludes the
tender offer only in that particular state."
2.

The Third-GenerationStatutes

The third-generation statutes allow an offeror to tender for as
many shares as he chooses, but severely restrict the use of the acquired shares. For example, the voting rights model requires the
affirmative vote of the disinterested shareholders before shareholders who acquire a certain percentage of stock can have voting
rights in the additional shares." The idea is to allow the shareholders to act collectively by voting to ensure a fair tender offer.6 5
The business combination model requires a shareholder to seek
board approval for the acquisition of additional shares over a specific threshold or for proposed business combinations with the
shareholder. 6 Failure to receive board approval prevents the
shareholder from completing those business combinations for as
long as five years even if the shareholder acquires control.6 7 Because the term "business combination" is defined broadly,6 8 this
restriction effectively limits the use of the assets by the shareholder to finance or leverage the acquisition or to freeze out the
minority shareholders in a second-tier acquisition and take com63. An offeror seeking to continue its tender offer in another state may avoid the SEC's
all-holders rule, thus allowing an offeror to avoid making an offer in a state in which it has
been barred from making an offer due to administrative or judicial action, so long as the
underlying statute is constitutional. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and
Best Price, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,016 (July 11, 1986).
64. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Supp. 1986). The Indiana statute requires a
shareholder vote to vest voting rights at three thresholds of ownership: 20%, 33/3 %, and
50%. Id. § 23-1-42-1. The Supreme Court held this statute constitutional in CTS Corp.
65. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986). In New York, an interested
shareholder is one who owns 20% of the voting stock. Id. § 912(a)(10).
66. See, e.g., id. § 912(b).
67. Id.
68. Under New York law, the definition of a business combination includes mergers and
consolidations, sales or dispositions of assets having a value equal to 10% or more of the
aggregate market value of all assets, liquidations and recapitalizations, issuance or transfer
to an interested shareholder by the resident domestic corporation of any stock having a
market value of 5% or more of the aggregate market value of all the outstanding stock of
the corporation, a reclassification of the securities or any other transaction that results in an
increase in the interested shareholders' proportionate share of outstanding shares, and any
receipt by the interested shareholders of loans, tax credits, or other financial assistance from
the resident domestic corporation. Id. § 912(a)(5).
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plete control of the corporation. 9 This model places significant
power in the board to deal with tender offers and is probably the
most effective statutory defensive tactic available to incumbent
management. The model encourages offerors to either deal with
the board or try to replace the board in a proxy fight prior to acquiring the requisite percentage of stock."°
The voting rights and business combination models both permit
the offeror to buy as many shares as possible through the tender
offer but effectively restrict the use of those shares. The business
combination model focuses on the role of the board, whereas the
voting rights model looks to the independent shareholders.
3.

The Fourth-GenerationStatutes

In response to possible hostile takeovers of significant corporations in their state, several states have adopted various statutory
models that can be described as fourth-generation takeover statutes because they apply to corporations that are not incorporated
in the state. These statutes generally require a substantial nexus
between the foreign corporation and the state. The nexus requirement often includes principal place of business or executive offices
in the state, a substantial number of assets, and shareholders and
employees in the state.7 1 This legislation was enacted when large

69. See generally Pinto & McGrath, Problems and Issues Raised in State's New Takeover Law, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 21; Pinto, N.Y. Law, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17.
70. If permitted under state law, a proxy fight could be avoided by seeking the written
consent of a majority of the directors to take action that would pressure the board, such as
the reduction of the size of the board. See Carnevale & Lee, Black & Decker Move Escalates
Takeover Battle, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1988, at 4. If an offeror purchases more than the
requisite percentage of shares without board approval, then even after replacing the board
the offeror is restricted for five years unless a majority of the disinterested shareholders
agree to opt out of the statute by amending the bylaws. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b).
Even that amendment may not be immediately effective; for example, in New York it would
not be effective until 18 months after approval. Id. § 912(d)(3)(iii).
71. For example, Massachussetts's statute is a voting rights model that requires the approval of the shareholders before an acquiror who has passed the 20%, 33%, and 50% ownership thresholds can exercise voting rights. See Massachusetts Adopts Broad Anti-Takeover Law, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1099 (July 24, 1987). The new law
applies to a corporation that has its executive offices in Massachusetts, has more employees
or capital assets in Massachusetts than in any other state, and has either more than 10% of
its shareholders residing in Massachusetts or more than 10% of its shares owned by Massachusetts residents. Id.
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corporations in these states which were incorporated in Delaware
were subject to potential hostile takeovers. 2
4. Delaware's Statute
Delaware's recently enacted takeover statute is a version of the
business combination model. The statute applies to corporations

North Carolina's statute follows the fair-price model. It requires the approval of 95% of
the shares to authorize certain business combinations unless the fair-price provisions are
met. See North Carolina Legislature Responds to Attempted Takeover of Burlington, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 829 (June 5, 1987). The new statute applies to a
foreign corporation if it has its principal place of business and more than 40% of its fixed
assets in North Carolina, if more than 10% of its shares are owned by North Carolina residents, and if more than 40% of its shareholders are North Carolina residents. Id.
Arizona's statute is a variation of the voting rights model with certain elements of the
business combination model. See Arizona Antitakeover Bill Signed During Special Session,
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1138 (July 31, 1987). Except in the election of
directors or managers, the acquiror cannot vote its shares without prior approval of the
disinterested shareholders. Id. The statute also precludes the acquiror from selling the corporation's assets to liquidate takeover debts for three years. Id. In addition to applying to
corporations that are incorporated in Arizona, the statute applies to a company incorporated under the laws of another state if it has at least 50 shareholders, its principal place of
business or principal executive offices are in Arizona, it has assets of $1 million or more in
Arizona, and it has more than 500 employees who are Arizona residents.
The Minnesota takeover statute provides elements of both the business combination
model and the voting rights model. See Minnesota Adopts Anti-Takeover Law After Special Legislative Session, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 987 (July 3, 1987). When a
party acquires more than 20% of a target's shares, it cannot vote those shares without the
approval of a majority of the disinterested shareholders. Id. In addition, the law prevents an
acquiror from selling any corporate assets for a period of five years unless the outside directors give their approval.
Washington used the business combination model to bar a party who has acquired 10% or
more of the target's stock from effecting certain business transactions for five years without
prior board approval. See New Washington Takeover Law Aimed at Protecting Boeing
from Pickens Raid, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1266 (Aug. 14, 1987) [hereinafter Washington Takeover Law]. The new statute protects a target incorporated in another
state if its primary offices are in Washington, it has more property in Washington than
elsewhere, the majority of its employees are Washington residents, the majority of its assets
are in Washington, and it employs more than 20,000 Washington residents. Id.
72. The Court's commerce clause analysis in CTS Corp. raises significant questions regarding whether these states can constitutionally regulate such corporations. See CTS Corp.
107 S. Ct. at 1649. Notably, at the time the various states had acted, Delaware had not
enacted its takeover statute. Now that Delaware has such a statute, its interplay with the
fourth-generation statutes raises a problem of inconsistent regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 240-260.
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incorporated in Delaware." s The law requires an offeror, before acquiring fifteen percent of a target's voting stock, to either receive
board approval for the purchase or for future business combinations with the offeror or purchase at least eighty-five percent of the
target's stock-excluding stock owned by inside directors and certain employee stock option plans-in the same transaction in
which it exceeded fifteen percent. After acquiring the fifteen percent, the offeror can obtain approval for the business combination
with a vote by the board and two-thirds of the disinterested stockholders. 741 Failure to meet these requirements restricts the offeror
from effectuating a business combination with the target for up to
three years. 5 The resulting statute reflects some compromise and

73. The use of only the state of incorporation as the nexus differs from other models,
which require that the corporation have assets, shareholders, and principal place of business
in the state. From a practical standpoint, Delaware could use only the state of incorporation
as the nexus because few of the publicly held corporations incorporated there could meet
any of the other tests. An estimated 179,000 companies are incorporated in Delaware, including 56% of the Fortune 500 companies and 45% of the companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. Fees and taxes generated by these incorporations yield an estimated
$156 million, which is 16% of the state's revenue. Barrett, DelawareMoves Closer to Adopting Law to Deter Hostile Takeovers, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 41, col. 4.
74. DmL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (Supp. 1988). The 85% provision is similar to the stock
redemption model except that it does not require the purchase of the stock. Its intent is to
encourage offerors to avoid two-tier tender offers and thus to provide equal opportunity for
all shareholders. Only those stock option plans in which the employee participants do not
have the right to determine confidentially whether to tender are excluded. Id. §
203(a)(2)(ii). The shares of the inside directors and employee stock plans that are not included in the calculation of the 85% are allowed to vote on the proposed business combination. Id.
75. Id. Delaware's enactment of this statute generated substantial controversy. See Hays,
Delaware Effort to Draft Takeover Law Stirs a Debate, Disturbs SEC Members, Wall St.
J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 11. Compare D. Bandow, Curbing Raiders is Bad for Business, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1988, at F2 (arguing that the statute helps management and hurts shareholders and the economy) with Veasey, A Statute Was Needed to Stop Abuses, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 1988, at F2 (arguing that Delaware took a moderate view to protect shareholders
from takeover abuses). However, corporations incorporated in Delaware threatened to incorporate elsewhere unless the legislature afforded them protection. Interestingly, legal scholars
have long debated whether state corporate law protects investors. Those on both sides of the
debate recognize that states compete for incorporations, creating a market for corporate
charters, but disagree about whether the market protects shareholders. Compare Cary,
Federalismand Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), with
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982). Critics of the market for charters view
it as a race for the bottom because states will sacrifice shareholder protection for a promanagement bias to attract incorporations and their revenue. State law is a form of eco-
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change from the initial proposal and differs substantially from
New York's statute, which first enacted the business combination
model. 76 New York's version restricts mergers for five years if the
board fails to approve the purchase of twenty percent of the stock
or a business combination with that purchaser." A corporation can
avoid the Delaware statute if a tender for eighty-five percent of the
stock is successful or the tender receives subsequent board and
supermajority approval of the business combination. New York has
no similar provision and therefore has fewer restrictions on the
power of the board. In New York, once a party has acquired
twenty percent and has failed to receive board approval, the only
way to effectuate a business combination with the purchaser before
the five-year restriction is through a bylaw amendment approved

nomic protectionism because it protects the state's interest in attracting and keeping corporations from incorporating elsewhere. Cary, supra.
Others view the competition in the market for corporate charters as a healthy development for shareholders. They argue that management generally will seek out those states
that are beneficial to shareholders; otherwise the value of the shares of those corporations
will be reduced if management is not maximizing the firm's value. The reduced value of
shares increases the corporation's cost of capital, which places the corporation at a cost
disadvantage in the market for its products. A failure to manage in the shareholders' interests also affects the managers by reducing the value of their services in the market for managers. If the value of the shares is reduced, the market for corporate control will also serve
to protect shareholder interests by encouraging the corporation to replace management and
reincorporate in another state whose law benefits shareholders. The market for corporate
charters thus encourages states to enact laws that are beneficial to shareholders. Under the
market for corporate charters thesis, state takeover statutes must be beneficial to shareholders because states are competing to enact laws that enhance shareholders' wealth. If the
statutes adversely affect the value of the corporation's shares, the markets for products and
managers will require reincorporation and states will compete by eliminating laws that deter

takeovers. R.

WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION

(1978). See also Fischel, supra.

See generally Romano, Law as a Product:Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, 1 JL.
EcoN. & ORG. 225 (1985); Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REv. 709 (1987) [hereinafter Romano, The State Competition Debate]. The
choice of reincorporation thus remains as a means to opt out of those statutes that harm
shareholders.
76. The original proposal dealt with a 10% purchaser and required a tender of 90% of the
stock to avoid the statute's requirements. Block & Hoff, Delaware's Proposed Takeover
Statute, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1987, at 5. After the CTS Corp. decision, Delaware considered
enacting a version of the voting rights model held constitutional by the Supreme Court. The
Council of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association decided against
that model because it could make takeovers easier by allowing an offer to go directly to the
shareholders for their vote without any role for the board of directors. Goldman, Delaware
Anti-Takeover Legislation Is Needed, Natl L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 31, 34.
77. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986).
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by a majority of the disinterested shareholders. Such an amendment does not take effect until eighteen months after approval."8
III. CTS CORP. v. DYNAMICs

CORP. OF AMERICA

In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the Supreme Court
decided that Indiana's Control Share Acquisition Chapter,7 9 which
follows the voting rights model, was constitutional."0 A corporation
that is subject to the Indiana statute must be incorporated in Indiana, must have a significant number of Indiana shareholders, and
must have substantial assets or its principal place of business or
office in Indiana."' Under the statute, once a shareholder acquires
a certain percentage of a corporation's shares, he may be denied
voting rights on the additional shares acquired unless the disinterested shareholders approve the purchase.8 2 The shareholder vote
must take place within fifty days of the commencement of the offer." If the disinterested shareholders fail to approve the purchase
and restore voting rights, the corporation may redeem the shares.8 4
A corporation can opt out of the statute by a shareholder vote to
amend the articles of incorporation or bylaws.8 5 In effect, a shareholder vote is required before any takeover of a corporation subject
to the Indiana statute can occur.
A.

The Circuit Court Decision

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
an opinion written by Judge Posner, found that the Indiana statute was preempted by the Williams Act and was unconstitutional
78. Id. § 912(d)(3).
79. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Supp. 1986).
80. 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
81. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-4(a) (Burns Supp. 1987). The act applies to a corporation
that has either "(A) More than ten percent (10%) of its shareholders resident in Indiana;
(B) More than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by Indiana residents; or (C) Ten
thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in Indiana." Id.
82. Id. § 23-1-42-9(a). The act defines "interested shares" as those regarding which the
acquirer or an officer or inside director of the corporation "may exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of directors." Id. § 23-1-42-3.

83. Id. § 23-1-42-7(b).
84. Id. § 23-1-42-10(b).
85. Id. § 23-1-42-5.
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under the commerce clause. 86 On the preemption issue, the court
followed the reasoning of Justice White's plurality opinion in Edgar and most of the other cases decided after Edgar that the Williams Act was intended to strike a balance between management
and the hostile offeror. 87 The delays for the offeror created by the
Indiana statute, which in practice extended the time frame provided by the Williams Act for a tender offer from approximately
one month to Indiana's maximum of fifty days, upset this
balance. 88
The court's commerce clause analysis focused on the fact that
the harm to nonresidents from restriction of hostile takeovers outweighed the benefits to Indiana residents. 9 According to the court,
Even if a corporation's tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which they are employed and the proportions in
which the earnings they generate are divided between management and shareholders depends on the market for corporate
control-an interstate, indeed international market that the
State of Indiana is not authorized to opt out of, as in effect it
has done in this statute.9 0
Although the court recognized the importance of the internal affairs doctrine, it nevertheless held that corporate law affecting the
market for corporate control in a "direct, intended, and substantial" manner would be subject to review under the commerce
clause.9 1
B.

The Supreme Court's Preemption Analysis

The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit decision and
upheld the Indiana statute. 92 Recognizing that the plurality opinion in Edgar was not binding because it did not "represent the
views of a majority," Justice Powell, writing for the majority, saw

86. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), reu'd, 107 S. Ct.
1637 (1987).
87. Id. at 262-63.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 264.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637.
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no need to question the reasoning in Edgar because the Court believed that "the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad
interpretation of the Williams Act articulated by Justice White in
[Edgar v.] MITE.""s The Court held that the Indiana statute in
fact furthered the goals of the Williams Act by protecting the
shareholders against both management and the offeror.9 4 Because

the Indiana statute permits the independent shareholders to vote
as a group, it helps avoid the coercive aspects of some tender offers, particularly front-loaded two-tier tender offers.9 5 The Court
viewed the Indiana legislation, unlike the provisions in the Illinois
statute, as furthering the federal policy of investor protection.98
The Court also focused on the practical problem of delay. Although the Indiana statute did not preclude an offeror from making a tender offer, the offeror normally would seek shareholder approval in order to have voting rights in the acquired shares.
According to the circuit court, the Indiana statute prevented the
tender offer itself from taking place within the time frames established by the Williams Act or its rules.97
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, did not find such a conffict between the timing requirements of the Williams Act and the
Indiana requirement of a shareholder vote within fifty days of the
commencement of the offer. That period is within the sixty-day
maximum for tender offers dictated by Congress,98 and an offeror
would not be precluded from purchasing the shares within the
minimum twenty-business-day period provided by the rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. 9 If the shareholders disapproved of the acquisition and denied voting rights, then, according
to the Court, a conditional offer would be possible. 100 The Court in

93. Id. at 1645.
94. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. The use of front-loaded two-tier tender
offers has lessened over the last several years and now appears to be more of a management
device in transactions to go private than an offeror's tactic. Grundfest, Proxmire's Doubletalk on Takeovers, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1987, at 34, col. 3.
96. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
97. See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 263 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107
S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
99. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1647 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986)).
100. Id.
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CTS Corp. discussed the concern of the plurality in Edgar that
unreasonable delays caused by state regulation would conflict with
the Williams Act. 101 In CTS Corp. the Court did not find such a
delay.10 2 The Court indicated that as long as the delay was within

the sixty-day maximum provided by Congress, the Court would
not find such a delay unreasonable.10 3
Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion relied on the specific
grant of authority given the states in section 28 of the Securities
and Exchange Act to find no preemption.104 He believed that this
legislative grant precluded any argument of preemption based on
conflicting purposes between state and federal law.105 He emphasized the state's "sacrosanct authority over the structure of domestic corporations" and the traditional state function of prescribing
voting rights.10 " In his dissent, Justice White viewed the Indiana
statute as harmful to investors making individual investment decisions, the primary area of protection of the Williams Act.1 07 He
distinguished other state corporate law affecting takeovers by
describing the Indiana statute as a law designed by its practical
effect to prevent tender offers l08
C. The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause Analysis
The majority opinion also found the Indiana statute constitutional under the commerce clause.109 According to the Court, the
statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce because
its impact was felt equally by resident and nonresident offerors. 110
The fact that most offerors likely would be nonresidents was irrelevant because of the even-handed approach of the legislation. The
Court also found that the Indiana statute did not create inconsistent regulation that could result in invalidation under the com101. The Court in CTS Corp. viewed the plurality in Edgar as being concerned with "unreasonable delays." Id. (adding emphasis to Edgar, 457 U.S. at 639).

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7866(a) (1982)).
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting).

108. Id. at 1655.
109. Id. at 1652.
110. Id. at 1648-49.
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merce clause because voting rights generally are prescribed by the
state of incorporation.111
The main thrust of the Court's opinion focused on whether the
Indiana statute impermissibly hindered tender offers. In finding
the statute constitutional, the Court discussed the significance of
state regulation of corporate governance and pointed out that the
market for corporate securities is dependent on corporations created and organized under state corporate law."' As the Court
indicated:
It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this
country for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing
their shares. A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters,
as well as ensuring that investors in such corporations have an
effective voice in corporate affairs." 3
The Court concluded that the Indiana statute reflected these
concerns by providing for a shareholder vote that permitted the
shareholders to act collectively on a possible change in manage1 4
ment and to protect themselves from coercive tender offers.
Because the concerns of the Indiana legislature were not groundless, the Court would not "second-guess the empirical judgments of
lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation."'" 5 In addition, the
Court appeared to retreat from its wholesale adoption of the benefits of the market for corporate control in Edgar to a more balanced view that the Constitution "does not require the States to
subscribe to any particular economic theory.""' 6 Although the statute would limit some tender offers, it was not unconstitutional because it did not prohibit the offer itself, the actual purchase of
shares, or the acquisition of control. According to the Court, the
shares and the corporation are creations of the state and the state
does not need to regulate these creations in the same manner as
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 1649 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Id. at 1650-52.
Id. at 1650-51.
See id. at 1651.
Id. at 1651.
Id.

OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 304 (1969)).
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other states as long as both residents and nonresidents have equal
access to the shares and the corporations.117
The Court also limited the broad statement in Edgar that a
state had "no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders."118 That statement may hold true for the Illinois statute
that applied to nonresident corporations, but Indiana had an interest in protecting all shareholders of Indiana corporations. In addition, the Court pointed out that the Indiana statute applied only
to corporations with substantial numbers of Indiana resident
shareholders.119
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia abandoned the balancing test
and limited the Court's inquiry in dormant commerce clause cases
to issues of discrimination against out-of-state interests or the creation of inconsistent regulation. According to Justice Scalia,
whether the Indiana statute protected management or shareholders should not have supplied the basis for a constitutional question
because such a judgment and the attendant balancing should have
been left to Congress, not the courts. He pointed out that "a law
20
can be both economic folly and constitutional.'

Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dissented on commerce clause grounds. He looked at the practical effect of the legislation and found that it would restrict the transfer
of shares in an interstate market. According to White, this was exactly what the commerce clause was designed to prevent states
21

from doing.1

IV.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The decision in CTS Corp. raises the issue of the extent of the
constitutional limitations on the role of the states in the regulation
of the market for corporate control. Two major themes in the CTS
Corp. opinion leave the decision's effect on the remaining statutory
models uncertain. 22 One theme found in the Court's preemption
117. Id. at 1652.
118. Edgar,457 U.S. at 644. See CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651, for limiting language.
119. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1652 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a)(3) (Supp. 1986)).
120. Id. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1656 (White, J., dissenting).
122. See generally Pinto, N.Y.'s Takeover Law After the CTS Ruling, N.Y.L.J., May 7,
1987, at 5.
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and commerce clause analysis is that the state in which the corporation is incorporated can play a role in protecting investors in the
tender offer context without offending the constitution on preemption or interstate commerce grounds. Another theme expressed in
the Court's analysis, particularly in the commerce clause discussion, is the great emphasis placed on a state's power to enact corporate laws governing resident corporations even though those
laws could interfere with tender offers and interstate commerce.
These two themes may in fact conflict if some state corporate law
is found to be unprotective of investors or is designed to protect
other corporate interests such as those of employees. In addition, a
situation may arise in which a state other than the state of incorporation attempts to protect investors or other interests.
The themes expressed in the CTS Corp. opinion fail to resolve
some basic questions raised by the various state statutory models.
What constitutes investor protection and what other interests can
the state protect through corporate law without being preempted
or impermissibly burdening interstate commerce? To what extent
will delays of tender offers conflict with federal policy? How necessary is it for the shareholders to have a role in the state regulation?
Is the state of incorporation the only state that has a role to play
in corporate governance; that is, can states regulate the internal
affairs of foreign corporations? Is the act of incorporation merely a
private activity that should not be scrutinized under the commerce
clause? These are the questions this Article addresses.
A.

Preemption
1.

Investor Protection

All the statutory models should withstand attack on preemption
grounds because these models do not interfere with the notion of
investor protection provided by the Williams Act. The protection
of investors was a significant factor in the Court's analysis of
whether the Indiana statute was preempted under the Williams
Act. Because the Court found that the Indiana statute protected
investors, it reasoned that the statute was consistent with the purpose of the Williams Act. Significantly, the majority opinion did
not accept or reject the plurality view in Edgar that the Williams
Act was designed by Congress to protect investors through a policy
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of neutrality between the hostile offeror and incumbent management.123 A majority of the Court believed that the Indiana statute
was consistent with that view. That same neutrality policy has
been advanced successfully in many of the challenges to state take1 24
over statutes after Edgar.

The Court also did not accept or reject Justice Stevens' view,
expressed in his concurrence in Edgar,that the concept of neutrality in the legislative history of the Williams Act applied only to the
Williams Act and was not aimed at state law. 1 25 Nor did the court
accept or reject Justice Scalia's view that section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act was indicative of Congressional intent to
permit most state regulation. 2 Although ultimately it is not clear
which approach the Court will take, the thrust of the opinion emphasized investor protection. This leaves open a challenge to state
takeover statutes on preemption grounds if the statutes fail to protect investors.
The issue of investor protection is complex and raises fundamental questions of corporate law that continue to be debated. It involves significant policy questions about the role of the corporation
123. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1982). In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that "[n]eutrality is, rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of investors." Although the unanimous opinion of the Court in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern Inc., 472
U.S. 1 (1985), again emphasized neutrality, it did so in interpreting the Williams Act, not in
questioning whether states have a role to play in tender offers. In a recent decision holding a
precommencement requirement of the Massachusetts Take-Over Bid Regulation Act to be
preempted by the Williams Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
indicated that a court should identify the "principal result" of a statute to see if it significantly alters the balance between management and the offeror, but that the "focus should
remain on determining whether the disclosure provisions are beneficial to the investors
caught between management and offerors." Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d
837, 850 (1st Cir. 1988).
124. E.g., Terry ex rel Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (Hawaii's
shareholder approval model statute held unconstitutional); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp.
1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri's shareholder approval model statute held
unconstitutional).
125. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring). "I am not persuaded, however, that
Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its own legislation is tantamount to a
federal prohibition against state legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent management." Id.
126. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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in society1 7 and the responsibility of directors in public corporations when the owners of the corporation are divorced from control.12' These questions become particularly pertinent in the tender
offer context, in which the impact of such offers on society, the
corporate constituencies, and the shareholders remains controversial.' 29 These controversial policy questions should not be resolved
in federal courts using a preemption analysis. The Williams Act
was not enacted specifically to resolve these questions or adopt any
particular theory regarding corporations but rather to protect investors in a manner consistent with federal securities law. 30 Investor protection under federal securities law traditionally has focused
on full disclosure.' Generally, state law has determined the substantive rights of investors."3 2 This tradition was continued in the
Williams Act through the tender offer procedural rules. These
rules were designed to facilitate the receipt and use of information

127. Professor Clark describes the five major clusters of views concerning the corporation's proper role in society in terms of the major strands of philosophical thought: dualism,
monism, modest idealism, high idealism, and pragmatism. R. CLARK, supra note 9, at 677.
Dualism regards the private and public spheres as having functions that ought to be kept
distinct. Id. at 677-78. Monism views many public and private interests as complementary
in the long run. Id. at 681. Modest idealism holds that corporations should voluntarily comply with applicable laws. Id. at 684. High idealism holds that corporations ought to pursue
residual goals, such as achieving accommodation with interest groups or furthering the public interest. Id. at 688. Pragmatism holds that corporations should seize opportunities to
perform public services on a profit-making basis. Id. at 694.
128. The concept of ownership divorced from control originated with the publication of A.
BERLE

& G.

MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1932). Much has

been written about this subject. See, e.g., Corporations and Private Property, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 235 (1983) (a collection of articles concerning THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY). See generally Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1986).
129. See Coffee, supra note 27. Congress has held several hearings on these issues during
the last year. See, e.g., Supreme Court Decision on Indiana Law Remains Prime Topic at
Takeover Hearings, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1011 (July 10, 1987).
130. No evidence indicates that Congress adopted the market for corporate control in
enacting the Williams Act. To the contrary, advocates of that market believed that the Williams Act impinges on it and should be repealed. E.g., Manne, Cash Tender Offers for
Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 231. The notion of neutrality in the
legislative history of the Williams Act cannot mean neutralizing state corporate law, because
although Congress may not have been aware of state takeover statutes in 1968, it was aware
of other state law provisions that could affect takeovers. See infra note 156.
131. See T. HAZEN, supra note 46, at 492-95.
132. See Boyer, Federalism and CorporationLaw: Drawing the Line in State Takeover
Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1986).

1988]

STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

in order to promote informed decisions. 133 State law that interferes
with this policy would be preempted. The Court in CTS Corp.,
however, did not limit its inquiry to whether the shareholders received and used information; instead, it analyzed investor protection in terms of the Indiana statute facilitating shareholder decisionmaking. Specifically, the Court evaluated whether the statute
provided the shareholders the means for a collective response to
coercive tactics.1 34 Presumably, the courts will continue to analyze
the statutory models according to whether these statutes protect
shareholders by facilitating their individual or collective decisions.13 5 When a state statute such as the Indiana statute either
facilitates or at least does not significantly interfere with the shareholders' decision, it probably will not be preempted even though
the statute's effect interferes with the tender offer and may preclude an economically beneficial transaction. 3
Although facilitation of investor decisionmaking is a significant
aspect of the Williams Act, it does not follow that a state corporate
law which does not facilitate such decisionmaking will necessarily
be preempted. If the Court ultimately adopts the neutrality argument it avoided in CTS Corp., then those statutes that limit the
shareholders' role probably will be preempted. Accepting the broad
implications of the neutrality policy, however, will undermine the
Court's concern for -tate corporate law. Thus, so long as the state

133. Note, SEC Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 580, 58384 (1987).
134. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1646. The need for collective action resulted from the coercive aspects of front-loaded two-tier tender offers. Thus the statute was similar to the WilHams Act in allowing for protection of the investors' response to avoid the pressure of trying
to gain the higher amount offered in the first tier.
135. Id. Justice White's dissent indicated that the Williams Act was designed to protect
individual shareholder autonomy as opposed to shareholders as a group, a position rejected
by the majority. Id. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting).
136. Significantly, the Court in CTS Corp. viewed the Indiana statute as protective of
investors because it allowed them to avoid the coercive aspects of two-tier tender offers.
Under the view of some commentators, such offers are not necessarily contrary to shareholders interests if the amount offered in both of the tiers at least equals the market price of the
stock prior to the tender offer. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,91
YALE L.J. 698 (1982). These authors advocate an approach to corporate control transactions
that posits that "those who produce a gain should be allowed to keep it, subject to the
constraint that [the] other parties to the transaction be at least as well off as before the
transaction." Id. at 698.
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law does not significantly interfere with the tender offer or actually
conflict with the Williams Act, it should not be preempted."' 7
All the statutory models previously described either facilitate or
do not significantly interfere with investor decisionmaking in the
tender offer. Four of the models facilitate shareholder decisionmaking; the voting rights, shareholder approval, and second-tier
models directly provide for collective shareholder voting as part of
the regulatory mechanism, and the full-disclosure model provides
for disclosure to assist the shareholders in their decisionmaking.
The remaining share redemption, fiduciary duty, and business
combination models have no direct shareholder role,3 8' but nevertheless should not be preempted under the rationale of CTS Corp.
They should still be viewed as protective of investors even though
the role of the shareholders is limited. The fact that some of these
models increase the power of the board does not mean investors
are injured.
a. Statutes That FacilitateDecisionmaking
In light of the decision in CTS Corp., the voting rights model
remains valid. 3 9 However, the SEC may effectively preempt the

137. In Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988), the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that a Massachusetts statute that
required an offeror to disclose his intent prior to acquiring 5% of the stock probably was
preempted. The court analyzed the issue of preemption by indicating that the law was detrimental to shareholders and that its deterrent effect to tender offers outweighed any benefits.
The court indicated that any detailed economic analysis was unnecessary and that normally
the courts would be reluctant to decide if shareholders were hurt. But because Congress
carefully considered the issue and the Williams Act allowed an offeror to wait 10 days to file
the required disclosure, the state could not "second guess[] the balance struck by Congress."
Id. at 850. In a broad sense the court seemed to suggest a balancing approach to the preemption issue, using a cost benefit approach. According to a more narrow view of the opinion, the court concluded that Congress was concerned with disclosure of purchases, and thus
the state law was in actual conflict with the Williams Act. The court conceded that the
Williams Act is not "an exclusive scheme for regulating takeover bids." Id. at 852.
138. Many of these models that do not involve the shareholders directly in their protection have opt-out provisions that permit shareholders to decide not to be subject to the
statute's protection.
139. The opinion in CTS Corp. limits the SEC's ability to use the Williams Act to preempt state takeover statutes unless they conflict directly with provisions or purposes of the
Williams Act and its rules. Because the Supreme Court has not yet embraced the neutrality
view, the SEC should be wary of using this rationale to preempt state law. In one instance
that merits comparison, the SEC did show a willingness to preempt state common law. By
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statute if it adopts proposed rule 19c-4, which is intended to deal
with the problems of corporations creating two classes of common
stock with unequal voting rights. Typically, the voting control of a
corporation is placed in one class of stock that is owned either by
management or by a family group, whereas the public owns a class
of stock with inferior voting rights. This capital structure effectively eliminates a hostile takeover because control cannot be purchased without the approval of the control group. 40 The effect of
the voting rights model is to deny voting rights when the share-

holders vote against the offeror, and this creates unequal voting
rights in the common shares. Under the proposed rule, corporations with disparate voting rights between classes of its outstanding stock usually would be delisted from trading on the exchanges
or in the over-the-counter market.1 41 Since both the corporation
and its shareholders would be harmed if the corporation were delisted, the proposed rule should severely limit the use of the voting
rights model. In proposing the rule, the SEC is using its authority
under section 19(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
which permits it to amend the rules of self-regulatory organizations in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. 4 2 Interestingly, the
SEC did not also invoke section 14(e)'of the Williams Act in support of its rule or indicate in its release the proposed rule's impact
43
on the voting rights model.

adopting the "all-holders and best-price rule," the SEC effectively preempted the common
law that issued from the Supreme Court of Delaware's opinion in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding target's self-tender offer that excluded
shares held by hostile tender offeror). Tender Offers-All-Holders and Best-Price-SEC
Rulemaking, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1186, at 1 (Aug. 18, 1986). The SEC stated that
its authority to adopt the rules derived from the Williams Act amendments to the Securities
and Exchange Act. Id. at 8. "The all-holders and best-price rules are 'necessary or appropriate' to implement the Williams Act. . . ." Id. at 9. But see Note, supra note 133, at 592-96
(the SEC had no authority to enact the all-holders rule in the context of a self-tender).
140. See Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified Securities": SEC Regulation of
Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U.L.R. 809 (1987).
141. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4).
142. Id. at 23,674. "The Commission believes that in proposing Rule 19c-4 it has met the
statutory standards necessary to add to the rules of [a self regulatory organization] as set
forth under section 19(c) of the Act." Id. The Commission also stated that it believes the
proposed rule to be "necessary and appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of sections 6,
15A and 14[(a)-(b)] of the Act." Id. at 23,675.
143. See Letter from Roberta S. Karmel, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities & Exchange Commission (July 9, 1987) (responding
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The shareholder approval model requires a shareholder vote
when purchasers reach certain thresholds and allows the disinterested shareholders to determine whether they approve of further
acquisition of the shares. Although this model can actually preclude the tender offer with this vote of approval, it was designed to
treat the tender offer like other control transactions, such as mergers, and to protect the shareholders from coercive takeovers. This
model treats the offeror differently than the voting rights model,
which allows the offer to take place when the offeror gambles on
the chances of a successful shareholder vote, but it does protect
the shareholders in a similar fashion by providing for their vote. If
the Court is focusing simply on investor protection and collective
action, then this model, which facilitates the shareholder decision,
probably is not preempted.
The second-tier model, which has been enacted to deal with twotier tender offers, is consistent with the CTS Corp. rationale of furthering investor protection by avoiding coercive two-tier tender offers. This model protects the remaining shareholders, whose shares
have not been purchased in the tender offer, by allowing them to
act collectively with a supermajority vote to approve the secondtier freezeout transaction. This freezeout transaction eliminates
the minority's equity position and gives the offeror complete control of the corporation. To avoid a supermajority vote on the
freezeout, the offeror can pay the remaining shareholders at least
as much as was offered in the original tender offer.144 In either
case, the coercion is avoided and the shareholders are protected by
acting collectively.
Given the explicit statutory permission for state blue sky regulation in section 28 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,141
the full-disclosure model, which is similar to such regulation,
should not be preempted. 146 In most cases, disclosure facilitates

to solicitation of comments in Exchange Act Release No. 24,623 (June 22, 1987) on proposed
Rule 19c-4).
144. See Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland FairPriceLegislation, 43
MD. L. REv. 266 (1984).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
146. But cf. Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (1987) (state disclosure laws should apply only to
target corporations that are not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act).
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the investor's decisionmaking. In addition, providing for disclosure
is one of the fundamental purposes of federal securities regulation.
In some cases this model requires the same disclosure of information that the Williams Act demands. 14 7 In other cases, this model

requires additional disclosure, which arguably is unnecessary and
burdensome.

48

Because the impact of the model is limited to

shareholders residing in the state, the fact that a state agency can
seek an indefinite delay in that state should not be the basis for
49
preemption.1

b. Statutes Without Direct Shareholder Role
The remaining statutory models do not involve the shareholders
directly in the protection provided by the statutes. The share redemption model is designed to protect shareholders after an offeror gains control. The fiduciary duty and business combination
models give additional power to the directors to protect shareholders and the corporation in a tender offer. None of these models
prevents the tender offer from taking place. 50
In Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 837 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1988), the court found that
a Massachusetts statute requiring disclosure of an ownership interest was highly likely to be
preempted by the Williams Act. Id. at 852. That statute, however, was found to be in actual
conflict with the Williams Act and not beneficial to investors. Id. at 852. In addition the
statute allowed the Secretary of State and the target corporation to request a one-year moratorium of a nationwide tender offer against those who failed to file timely. Id. at 847.
147. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Cone. LAW § 1603(a)(6) (McKinney 1986). Section 1603(a)(6) and
SEC rule 14d-100 (schedule 14D-1) require similar information about the offeror's interest
in the target company's securities.
148. See supra note 30.
149. It has been suggested that if the Court adopts the Edgar plurality's neutrality approach, which supports the market for corporate control, such a statute might still be open
to a commerce clause challenge. For example, a significant number of shareholders residing
in the state could in effect block the offer. See Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit
to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 105, 112 (1987). But in Edgar
the Court was concerned about the extraterritorial effect of the Illinois statute because a
state agency could seek an injunction against the tender offer nationwide. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1932). Further, the Court suggested that blue sky regulation
that is intended to protect resident shareholders would survive a commerce clause challenge.
Id.
150. The Court in CTS Corp., comparing the Indiana statute with the Illinois statute in
Edgar,indicated that the Indiana statute did not impose indefinite delays on tender offers.
CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1646. Although the directors may be able to impose indefinite
delays by adopting defensive tactics under the fiduciary duty model, this does not necessarily imply harm to the shareholders or the lack of a remedy against the directors.
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The Court in CTS Corp. emphasized the Indiana statute's provisions that protect the "independent shareholder against both the
contending parties."' 5 1 These provisions allow the "shareholdersto
evaluate the fairness of the offer collectively.' 15 2 Although this emphasis suggests that statutes not involving the shareholders directly may be preempted, the courts should be wary of preempting
those models on such a narrow view of investor protection. The
Court in CTS Corp. was faced with a statute that involved shareholders directly but, significantly, it never indicated that other
statutory protection would be preempted. The Court specifically
referred to provisions of state corporate law that permit staggered
voting for directors and cumulative voting. These provisions, which
do not facilitate shareholder decisionmaking during the tender offer, were held valid even though they can delay an offeror from
53
gaining control.
The share redemption model, like the voting rights model, has
been designed to deal with coercive two-tier tender offers. The
share redemption model, however, goes further than a shareholder
vote by requiring that on acquiring a certain percentage of stock,
the offeror purchase all shares of the remaining shareholders. 54 Although the shareholders do not play a direct role, the model is consistent with the Williams Act, which protects investors by assuring
them an equal opportunity to receive the premium in the tender
offer. 5 5 This protection not only aids decisionmaking by providing
sufficient time but also creates a substantive right to receive the
premium. M The share redemption model provides shareholders
with more rights of equal opportunity beyond the initial tender of-

151. Id. at 1645.
152. Id. at 1646 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 1647-48. The Court noted that a state's cumulative voting laws can delay the
ability of tender offerors to acquire complete control over the target's corporate affairs. Id.
at 1648. See Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charterand By-Law Techniques, 34
Bus. LAW. 537, 538-39 (1979).
154. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (shareholders subject to a
control transaction are entitled to statutory rights and remedies when a controlling group
holds at least 30% of the voting shares that are entitled to be cast in an election for
directors).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)-(7) (1982).
156. See Pryor v. United States Steel Corp., 794 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
445 (1986). Congressional creation of a substantive right that normally would arise under
state corporate law suggests that when Congress wanted to affect state corporate law, it did
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fer. Arguably, the requirements of this model may conflict with the
provision of the Williams Act if the model's requirement of equal
opportunity is viewed as exclusive. 57 The Williams Act provides
for equal opportunity only in the tender offer, however, and should
not preclude a state from providing greater rights that protect investors and insure that shareholders are not left with minority
status.
The fiduciary duty and business combination models place significant power in the hands of the board of directors if the board is
faced with a hostile tender offer. Because these models arguably do
not facilitate the decision of the investors but instead appear to
replace this decision with the decision of the board, they may have
more difficulty withstanding a preemption attack. However, these

models should not be viewed as inconsistent with the Williams Act
because they do not necessarily harm investors.
The fiduciary duty model, which broadens the interests to be
considered by the board to include corporate constituencies other
than the shareholders, could be viewed as not being in the interests
of investors. Protecting other constituencies, however, does not
necessarily mean that the shareholders will be harmed. 5 8 Only in
the rarest situations could management institute policies that ar-

so explicitly. This interpretation conflicts with the implicit preemption argument based on
neutrality.
157. Prior to the Williams Act, the issue of equal opportunity had always been the province of state law. See Hazen, Transfers of Corporate Control and Duties of Controlling
Shareholders-CommonLaw, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-anda Proposalfor
Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1977). But cf. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839
F.2d 837 (1st Cir. 1988) (Congressional concern with disclosure of ownership meant that a
state law changing the timing of such disclosure was likely to be preempted).
158. Interestingly, when discussing the collective action of the shareholders, the Court in
CTS Corp. twice referred to them as acting in the "corporation's best interest" rather than
their own "best interests." CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1646. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), the Supreme Court of Delaware, in upholding a self
tender that excluded a hostile offeror, stated that "the board's power to act derives from its
fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders." Id. at 954. But cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware indicated that a lockup option could
violate a director's fiduciary duty when an auction for the company had begun. The court
indicated that the decision in Unocal Corp. permitted consideration of other constituencies
provided that "rationally related benefits accrued to the stockholders." Id. at 182.
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guably were not in the interests of investors. 1 59 Even if management were more concerned with constituencies other than the
shareholders, the Williams Act does not concern itself with defining the parameters of fiduciary duty, which traditionally is a state
law issue. 6 0
In some cases the fiduciary duty model explicitly protects directors who implement defensive mechanisms by limiting an action
under state law against the directors.16' This model also should
pass muster under the protection of investors concept since the implementation of defensive mechanisms does not mean that all offers are precluded or that a higher price may not result.1 62 Moreover, the courts have not given management unfettered control to

159. The courts traditionally have invoked the fiduciary duty of management to determine that it has not served the interests of the shareholders. E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (ordering payment of dividend when controlling shareholder acted unreasonably in refusing to declare special dividends).
160. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). See generally D. BLOCK, N.
BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BusiNEss JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1987) (scope of fiduciary duty defined by state law).
161. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986). The statute provides
that "[a] director shall be liable.., only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence...
that his action or failure to act involved an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for the best
interests of the corporation." Id. The statute further provides:
[A] director, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, shall consider the interests of the corporation's
shareholders and, in his discretion may consider... :
(1) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and
customers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considerations;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served
by the continued independence of the corporation.
Id. § 1701.59(E).
162. Those who favor the market for corporate control disagree on the role of the board in
a hostile takeover. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1165-74 (management
should be passive when faced with a tender offer) with Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporation:The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819
(1981) (management should bargain with offeror to secure higher price or seek a competitive
bid) and Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV.
1028 (1982) (same). The idea that directors should in some cases auction their company
when facing a takeover is gaining some acceptance by the courts. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 1.73 (Del. 1986) (directors' duties to an auctioner
changed when sale of the company was inevitable).
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thwart all takeovers.1 3 The courts have shown a willingness to use
the fiduciary duty analysis to meet the changing legal environment
in takeovers.16 4 Thus, as long as some monitoring of management's
response to hostile takeovers is present, the courts should not invalidate the law on preemption grounds."6 5
The business combination model, which also places the power in
the board, operates differently from the fiduciary duty model. Although an offeror is free to tender for as many shares as he
chooses, the model effectively requires an offeror to negotiate with
the board and receive board approval. Without such approval, the
model limits the offeror's ability to use the corporation's assets to
help finance the acquisition or to eliminate minority shareholders
for as long as five years. As in the fiduciary duty model, no direct
shareholder role exists, but the shareholders may opt out of the
statute by amendment to the corporation's bylaws. Such an
amendment, however, may not take effect until eighteen months
after the vote. 6 An offeror is faced with three possible choices:
acquire a percentage of the stock below the threshold and begin a
proxy fight, negotiate with the board, or acquire as much stock as
possible and wait until the requisite period has elapsed. 67 In Dela163. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (concluding that when confronted by a pending takeover bid, the board's duty is "enhanced" by
"the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders"). In fact, the business combination
model may create closer judicial scrutiny of the board's actions. See infra note 173.
164. E.g. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (under
New York law, directors may have violated their fiduciary duty when they favored one bidder with a lockup option on corporate assets at an unfair price). See also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (directors violated duty of loyalty
when they favored a bidder in an auction situation with a lockup option).
165. Investors have several mechanisms to eliminate management insulation from hostile
takeovers: for example, litigation based on fiduciary duty, the proxy system, which allows
shareholder to voice their concerns, and the proxy fight to replace management. Investors
have used these mechanisms with varying success. Arguably, if management uses state law
to create an environment without some monitoring or shareholder role that precludes all
hostile takeovers, preemption may be available because the corporation has misappropriated
an opportunity created by Congress.
166. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(d)(3)(iii) (McKinney 1986).
167. If the shareholders opt out of the statute's coverage, the offeror must wait 18 months
before it can complete the stock acquisition. Id. If the shareholders do not opt out and the
board does not approve the stock acquisition, the offeror must wait five years before any
subsequent corporate transaction. Id. § 912(b). In addition, the statute requires a fair price
in any freezeout transaction. Id. § 912(c)(3)(D).
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ware an offeror has an easier time avoiding the statute because he
can tender for eighty-five percent of the shares or seek board approval and a two-thirds disinterested-shareholder vote approving
the business combination.16
An important policy question for the fiduciary duty and business
combination models is whether they are in the best interests of
investors. The Williams Act does not necessarily resolve this issue.
If the models provide a mechanism for management to maximize
the value for shareholders by negotiating a higher price, finding a
higher bidder, or taking defensive measures that result in increased efficiency, then investors will be protected. 6 ' On the other
hand, if the models provide an absolute defense to takeovers, then
management is left less accountable, which may be harmful to investors.17 0 The probable outcome for these models is somewhere in
the middle; in some cases shareholders will benefit and in others
they will be harmed. 7 1 Ultimately, the directors' fiduciary duty is

168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203(a) (Supp. 1988).
169. Cf. Romano, The State Competition Debate, supra note 75. Professor Romano sees
the statutes, like other defensive tactics, as increasing premiums at the cost of a reduced
number of bids. Id. at 737-39. But cf. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
255 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), in which Judge Posner conceded that the

evidence of whether particular defensive tactics could increase or decrease shareholders is
mixed.
170. When management does not control the ownership of the shares it is rarely able to
insulate the corporation from a permanent takeover. Although most hostile takeover attempts are successful, even those that fail usually result in some form of buyout for the
corporation. Coffee, supra note 27, at 1149.
171. Two recent studies have concluded that the New York business combination model
and the Ohio fiduciary duty model resulted in a decrease in the wealth of shareholders of
corporations subject to those models. BUR. OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM'N, STATE REGULATION
OF TAKEOVERS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: THE EFFECTS OF NEW YORK'S 1985 TAKEOVER
STATUTES

45-46 (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter N.Y.

TAKEOVER STATUTES]; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

ECONOMIST, SEC. & EXCHG. COMM'N, SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF OHIO LEGISLATION

AFFECTING TAKEOVERS 22 (May 18, 1987) [hereinafter OHIO TAKEOVERS]. In New York the

overall decline was estimated at $1.2 billion, based on the decline in all covered corporations
when the law was announced. N.Y. TAKEOVER STATUTES, supra, at 45-46. The actual rate of
decline was under 1%. Id. at 45. An Ohio study estimated a 1.68% to 3.24% market decrease. OHIO TAKEOVERS, supra,at 22. These results should not control a preemption analy-

sis; both studies were based on stock price data, which do not always reflect a direct relationship between the event and the market reaction. Courts should be wary of using market
price studies as the basis for concluding that shareholders are harmed. See R CLARK, supra
note 9, at 542. As the Ohio study indicated, stock market returns are merely the market's

first guess as to the impact of the law; the sampling may not be the best indicator, and other
factors may influence the pricing. OHIO TAKEOVERS, supra, at 22-23. Without looking at the
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the issue.7 2 In fact, the models may place a greater burden on the
directors to deal with a potential acquiror than is normally the
case without the statutes. 7 3 For example, Delaware's concern in
enacting its statute appeared to be the abuses of some offerors,
such as those proposing front-loaded two-tier offers.7 4 If a target
were faced with an all-cash offer deemed to be fair, whether the

actual use of these statutes in the context of a takeover, it is hard to conclude that the
statutes in fact have hurt shareholders.
172. The New York statute requires all the directors to vote, whereas the Minnesota law
requires only the vote of the disinterested directors. Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b)
(McKinney 1986) with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673(1)(d) (West Supp. 1988). Although generally a vote by disinterested directors may by preferable, such a vote should not be mandated by federal law because state courts have the ability to determine whether a given
transaction involves a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Delaware, the courts are less deferential when interested directors are involved. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985). In Unocal Corp. the court stated that the burden on directors in takeovers is
"materially enhanced" when a majority of the board is comprised of outside independent
directors. Id. at 995.
173. For example, the New York statute raises interesting questions regarding its interplay with the business judgment rule. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b). The statute provides that the shareholder who seeks advance approval of the interested business combination must make a good-faith proposal to the board in writing. The board must respond to
the offer in writing, "setting forth its reasons for its decision regarding such proposal,"
within 30 days or a shorter period if required by the Securities and Exchange Act. Rejection
affects a future board's business judgment because it may not approve business combinations with the shareholder for five years thereafter. Whether the significance of this decision
or the requirement of a written response will result in closer judicial scrutiny of the decision
itself as opposed to the decisionmaking process is unclear. The legislation may also shift the
burden to the directors. A memorandum issued by the governor's counsel when the legislation was proposed indicated that the directors
would have the burden of assuring that the provisions of the section are not
used to the detriment of the resident domestic corporation's shareholders or
employees or the other constituencies that the board represents.... The business judgment rule could be applied in a new context-given the proposed legislation, certain defensive tactics might no longer be subject to the protection
of the [rule] ....
N.Y. STATE ExEc. DEPT. MEMORANDUM CH. 915, 208th Sess., reprinted in 2 McKMNEY's 1985
SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK 3184, 3192 [hereinafter MEMORANDUM CH. 915]. The enactment

of section 402(b) of the New York Business Corporation Code, N.Y. Bus CORP. LAW § 402(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1988), which was designed to limit liability for breaches of some fiduciary
duties, could, however, undercut this protection. See infra note 176.
174. Goldman, supra note 76.
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directors would be able to use the statute is unclear. Using the
statute might invite increased judicial scrutiny.1 5
In order to find a preemption, the courts will have to assume
that the board will act only in its own interests when negotiating,
that the courts are unable to monitor management's role effectively under fiduciary duty standards,"' and that the Williams Act
was designed to provide unrestricted access to the tender offer.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected the use of federal securities law to impinge on the corporate governance and fiduciary
duties traditionally imposed under state law."'7 In its preemption
analysis, the Court should not conclude that directors will use their

175. The Delaware courts usually apply the business judgment rule to actions taken by
the board and test it by whether the tender offer is in the best interests of the corporation
and the shareholders. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, "[i]f a defensive measure
is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation
to the threat posed." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). If
the directors use the statute and are not faced with a coercive offer it may not be reasonable
in relation to the threat.
176. Recent statutory enactments that were designed to limit or eliminate some of the
directors' liability may have a significant impact on the ability of courts to review the activities of directors in hostile tender offers. See Hanks, States Move to Adopt Statutory Limitations on DirectorLiability, Legal Times, Oct. 12, 1987, at 19, col. 1. Although some of the
statutes were designed to deal with tender offers, many were enacted in response to the
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the Delaware
Supreme Court found a breach of the duty of care by directors who approved the acquisition of a corporation at a substantial premium in a friendly transaction without being fully
informed. Id. at 881. The decision and the rising costs of directors and officers liability insurance were the impetus for statutes permitting the elimination of liability or money damages for certain breaches of fiduciary duty, increasing the standard of care from negligence
to gross negligence, or expanding the use of indemnity by the corporation. Hanks, supra.
These statutes normally focus on breaches of the duty of care as opposed to the duty of
loyalty. Most of the litigation involving hostile tender offers involves a breach of the duty of
care because the courts rarely view the defensive mechanisms of the target's directors as a
conflict of interest. Thus, unless the courts change their view of these statutes, they may
effectively eliminate the monitoring effect of the derivative suit in the context of hostile
tender offers. However, some statutes, such as the Delaware statute, eliminate monetary
damages and do not preclude equitable relief, which may be effective in monitoring the
directors' activities during a tender offer. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b)(7) (1988).
In addition, many states, including Delaware, require a shareholder vote before its limitations on liability are effective. Id. Those corporations that seek a shareholder vote to eliminate damages for duty of care liability would be expected to have to disclose under federal
securities law the interplay between that elimination of liability and the state takeover statutes that give the board more power.
177. See Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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power under the models to the detriment of investors. Such a conclusion precludes the courts from using a case-by-case fiduciary
duty analysis to determine whether management is using the models to benefit investors. In its discussion of the preemption issue in
CTS Corp., the Court indicated, in dictum:
In the unlikely event that management were to take actions
designed to diminish the value of the corporation's shares, it
may incur liability under state law. But this problem does not
control our pre-emption analysis. Neither the [Williams] Act nor
any other federal statute can assure that shareholders do not
suffer from the mismanagement of corporate officers and
directors. 178

In addition, some of the models should not be preempted because several of them have provisions allowing the shareholders to
opt out of a particular model. 179 These provisions may have been
intended to allow further shareholder involvement. Such involvement promotes shareholder protection and makes the law less regulatory and more supplementary. Although some commentators
would prefer an opt-in regimen as opposed to an opt-out, 180 given
management's ability to lobby for particular legislation and the
costs of the statute,' 8' this choice should not make a difference
178. CTS Corp. 107 S. Ct. at 1647 n.9 (1987) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
179. The idea of opting into a statute by a shareholder vote as opposed to opting out
arguably is more in line with the idea of shareholder rights and corporate law as enabling.
Yet shareholders have shown a willingness to amend their certificates by adding antitakeover amendments viewed as harmful to shareholders. See Shark Repellents: The Role and
Impact of Antitakeover Amendments, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 83,714 (Sept. 7, 1984). This evidence could be used to suggest that shareholder
voting is meaningless or that shareholders are willing to accept defensive mechanisms because they increase their premiums. Cf. articles by Romano, supra note 75.
180. Interestingly, recent enactments that limit damages against directors for breaches of
fiduciary duty require a corporation to opt into the rule, whereas usually one needs to opt
out of the protection provided by the takeover statutes. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7)(19-1) with id. § 203.
181. See Romano, The State Competition Debate, supra note 75, at 754. In another article, Professor Romano discusses the political activity of major corporations in the enactment
of takeover statutes. Romano, supra note 56. She concludes that the legislatures are reacting
to the concerns of a local firm in situations free of discernible political costs. Id. at 188. This
appears to be true of the fourth-generation statutes-firms incorporated in Delaware have
lobbied for protection in states in which they have a major presence. Professor Romano's
description of Connecticut's takeover statute, where little activity occurred by groups either
in support of or against the legislation, was not the experience in New York. The presence
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from a preemption point of view.18 2 In order for the choice to be
significant, the court would have to determine that the model was
not protective of investors and further that the opt-out was illusory and did not provide the necessary investor protection. 83
Given that the trading markets are becoming increasingly dominated by institutional investors, who may be able and willing to
challenge management, the ability to opt out of the regulation may
not be insignificant.
2.

Conflicts with the Williams Act

None of the statutory models, except possibly the shareholder
approval model, appears to have provisions that conflict directly
with the Williams Act. In light of the Court's analysis in CTS
Corp., the fact that the other types of statutes may cause delays of
the tender offer or increase the costs of takeovers should not be
84
significant.1
a. Actual Delays
The shareholder approval model differs from the voting rights
model that was found constitutional in CTS Corp. because this
model actually replaces the tender offer with the shareholder vote
by requiring a vote before the acquisition of shares at certain
thresholds. Although this model can also be used to avoid the coercive aspects of two-tier tender offers,'8 5 it presents more problems
than the other models because it actually precludes the offeror
from making the tender offer. The other statutory models allow
of the securities industry in New York caused active lobbying against the legislation. New
York nevertheless enacted probably the most pro-management statute of all of the models.
182. But see Coffee, The Future of CorporateFederalism: State Competition and the
New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZo L. REv. 759, 773
(1987).
183. It is interesting to note that the SEC has presented for public comment the idea that
shareholders should be allowed to opt out of certain Williams Act provisions. Concept Release on Takeovers for CorporateControl:Advance Notice of Possible Commission Actions,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84.018 (Mar. 9, 1987).
184. If the delays are indefinite and go beyond Congressional mandate in the Williams
Act, however, or if the costs relate to unreasonable regulation that clearly does not protect
investors, a preemption problem may arise. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
185. See Kreider, FortressWithout Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L. REv.
108 (1983).
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the offers to take place, albeit subject to limitations and conditions
that may in practice preclude the offer.
In CTS Corp., the Court distinguished the Indiana voting rights
statute from the Illinois statute in Edgar because the Indiana law
did not impose an indefinite delay on tender offers or prohibit the
offer after twenty business days-the earliest period in which the
offer could be consummated.186 The shareholder approval model
does not allow any purchases to proceed without shareholder permission. This is clearly different from the Indiana statute. Arguably this statutory replacement of the tender offer with a shareholder vote could be preempted. Although an offeror should be
able to have a shareholder vote within the maximum tender offer
period of sixty days, the actual purchase of shares normally would
not be completed within twenty days, the minimum time frame
provided in the rules.'87 With this model, however, the delay would
be caused by a shareholder vote that implements their decisionmaking, whereas under the Illinois statute, a state agency had the
approval power that could have resulted in unreasonable delay.1 88
The shareholder approval model presents a court with a statute
that is designed for investor protection and permits collective action similar to the voting rights model, but which interferes directly with the nationwide tender offer process. 18 If the statute is
186. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1646.

187. The Court in CTS Corp. concluded that the Indiana statute, which required a vote
within 50 days, did not conflict with the timing requirements of the Williams Act because it
did not impose an absolute 50-day limit or preclude the purchase as soon as federal law
permitted. Id. at 1647. The shareholder approval model would not permit purchases within
the earliest permissible time-20 business days-but a tender offeror could make the offer
conditional on shareholder approval. The Court in CTS Corp. indicated that an offeror

could tender conditionally, based on the shareholder vote. Id. A conditional tender should
be possible under the shareholder approval model as well, even though the shares could not
be purchased legally until after the vote. If in fact such an offer could not be made, this
might be instrumental to the issue of preemption.
188. In CTS Corp., the Court indicated that the Indiana statute did not prohibit an offer
within 20 days or allow the state to determine the fairness of the offer; "[r]ather, the Act
allows shareholdersto evaluate the fairness of the offer collectively." Id. at 1646 (emphasis
in original).

189. According to the Court's commerce clause analysis in CTS Corp., the Indiana statute
protected the shareholders by giving them the right to collectively decide if a change of
control was desirable. Id. at 1651. "A change of management may have important effects on
the shareholders' interests; it is well within the State's role as overseer of corporate governance to offer this opportunity." Id.
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preempted because tender cannot be made within the 'twenty-day
minimum, then form triumphs over substance. That is, under the
voting rights model, a tender offer could be made, but in practice it
would wait for a shareholder vote.
b. PracticalDelays
Although the other statutory models permit a tender offer to be
made, the tender offeror will usually refrain from doing so until the
requirements of the statute are met. For example, under the Indiana statute, an offeror who acquires stock but fails to get shareholder approval will own a substantial number of shares without
voting power. In CTS Corp., the Court analyzed the delays caused
by the practical effect of the Indiana statute to see whether a
tender offer could be accomplished within the time frames provided by the Williams Act. However, whether the court will apply
the same analysis to determine the practical impact of other statutory models is unclear.
The Court in CTS Corp. began its discussion of this practical
impact by "assuming that the Indiana Act imposes some additional
delay."' 190 If, however, such delays or limits on the power to control
are the basis of future preemption, then the Court's concern for
other state corporate law, such as staggered board elections, which
has the same effect would also be upset.1 91 According to the Court,
the possibility of delay was insufficient, and "[tjhe longstanding
prevalence of state regulation in this area suggests that if Congress
had intended to preempt all state laws that delay the acquisition
of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said so
explicitly.' 9 2 Thus, courts should first determine if the regulation
permits the actual tender offer to proceed within the time frame of
the Williams Act. If it does, then the fact that the statute may also
delay or limit ultimate control under the guise of state corporate
law should not matter for preemption purposes. All the models ex190. Id. at 1647.

191. Id. at 1647-48. Although Judge Posner was able to distinguish traditional state corporate law that may delay takeovers from those state takeover statutes whose effect on
tender offers is "direct, intended and substantial," it is obvious from the Supreme Court's

view that the distinction was unacceptable. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250, 264 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
192. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1648.
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cept the shareholder approval model permit the actual tender offer
to be completed.19
The fact that the fiduciary duty and business combination models give increased power to the board and may in practice replace
the tender offer with the proxy fight should not be a ground for
preemption. Under both models, an offeror can purchase shares
within the time frame provided by the Williams Act.19 4 Although
the failure to get board approval may make it unlikely that a
tender offeror would choose to make the offer, replacing the board
always remains a possibility.1 9 5 The five-year restriction under the
business combination model may be unreasonable to an offeror in
operating or financing the corporation, but that delay does not directly prevent the tender offer from going forward. The Court in
CTS Corp. was fearful that a concern for delays in seeking control

after a successful tender offer might be extended to preempt state
law that had always been considered valid.19
B.

Commerce Clause

The commerce clause of the Constitution clearly gives Congress
authority to regulate interstate commerce. However, it does not explicitly restrict state regulation when Congress has not acted. If
Congress has taken no action in an area, then the extent to which a
state can regulate interstate activities rests on the application of
the "dormant" or unexercised commerce clause. 97 According to
193. The full-disclosure model may preclude the offer in a given state, but that should not
create problems under preemption given explicit permission for blue sky legislation in the
Exchange Act. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
194. A New York corporation's board must decide on the proposal within 30 days. N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney 1986).
195. When instituting a proxy fight to replace the board under the business combination
model, the hostile bidder's chances of success are reduced because the bidder can acquire
and thus vote only the threshold number of the outstanding shares. In New York that would
be only 19%, which means the bidder would have to convince at most another 32%, assuming all shareholders vote. See Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985). The Delaware Supreme Court was faced with a poison pill that was effective upon the
purchase of 20% of the stock. The court did not believe that the plan would restrict a proxy
fight because "many proxy contests are won with an insurgent ownership of less than 20%,
and ... very large holdings are no guarantee of success." Id. at 1355.
196. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
197. See G. Gunther, supra note 22. See also Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125 (1979). According to Professor Tushnet, the dormant
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Professor Tribe, the Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens'9" established the theme that state activity affecting interstate commerce
will "be judged in light of the desirability of permitting diverse
responses to local needs and the undesirability of permitting local
interference with such uniformity as the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce may require. ' 'xg
When analyzing state economic regulation, the Court has employed various tests. 20 0 Generally, the Court will strike down a
statute that regulates interstate commerce directly, discriminates
against interstate commerce, or favors state economic interests
over out-of-state interests.2 ° ' When a nondiscriminatory statute
has an indirect effect on interstate commerce, it will be upheld
"[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce

commerce clause should be used sparingly, especially given Congress's ability to preempt
state law. He would use an enhanced due process analysis of state regulation. Id. at 146. See
also Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982). Professor Eule argues that state parochialism today is more likely to eviscerate the democratic
process than free trade, and he advocates a process-oriented protection of representational
government. Id. at 428-29. He also emphasizes the ability of Congress to preempt as a reason to limit the dormant commerce clause's use, especially given the role of regulatory agencies. Id. at 435.
198. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
199. L. TRmE, supra note 23, at 407. According to Tribe, the idea in Cooley of classifying
the regulation as "national" or "local" has become less important and the focus is on how
the state proposes to regulate. Id.
200. According to the Court in CTS Corp., "as the volume and complexity of commerce
and regulation has grown in this country, the Court has articulated a variety of tests in an
attempt to describe the difference between those regulations that the Commerce Clause permits and those regulations that it prohibits." CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1648. The Court cited
Raymond Motor Transportationv. Rice, which reviews the various considerations the Court
has employed to determine what is permissible, such as the direct-indirect distinction, the
need for a single rule versus the need for diversity, and the regulation of state police power
versus regulations of commerce. Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 491 n.15
(1978), cited in CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1648. The Court in Raymond Motor Transportation indicated that it had employed various tests, but that
no single conceptual approach identifies all the factors that may bear on a particular case. Our recent decisions make clear that the inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory
concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course on interstate commerce.
Id. at 441.
201. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986).
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are only incidental... unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."2 2 In analyzing the Indiana statute under the commerce
clause, the Court in CTS Corp. did not discuss whether the regulation was direct or indirect.20 3 Instead, it looked at whether the
statute was discriminatory, created inconsistent regulation, and
unduly hindered or limited tender offers. 04 Under the Court's
analysis in CTS Corp., none of the models described should be
found to be discriminatory. The models have the same effects on
tender offers whether or not the offeror is a resident of the particu-

202. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)). Professor Regan argues that the dormant commerce clause
should be used to prevent the states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism as
opposed to regulation that merely has a protectionist effect. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIc. L.
REv. 1091, 1094-95 (1986). He rejects the use of balancing, particularly if it looks to the costs
to any private party as an argument against the statute, and would find a statute to be
protectionist if it had been adopted to improve the competitive position of local economic
actors relative to out-of-state competitors and it used a traditional protectionist device such
as a tariff or quota. Id. Justice Scalia cites the article with approval in his concurrence in
CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring).
203. A plurality of four Justices in Edgar found the illinois statute to be a direct burden
on interstate commerce and therefore invalid. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643
(1982). The plurality found the statute to be a direct burden because it could preclude
shareholders who were residents of another state from transacting in interstate commerce
with the offeror. Id. at 642. If the post-Edgar statutes burden interstate commerce directly,
then a court could find them invalid without weighing their benefits. Most of the models
may in fact defeat or deter a tender offer, but they do not directly prohibit it. All the models except the full-disclosure model do not involve a government entity but deal instead
with corporate governance. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 762
(S.D. Ohio) (discussing state's authority to regulate corporate control as indirect burden),
aff'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986). The shareholder approval model may have more of a
direct impact on interstate commerce than do other statutory models. It does not follow,
however, that such regulation is per se invalid and not subject to the balancing test used
when an impact is indirect. In Edgar, the Illinois statute gave a governmental agency the
power to stop a tender offer, whereas the determination of whether a tender offer is accepted under the shareholder approval model depends on the nongovernmental action of the
shareholders. In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573 (1986), the Supreme Court referred to Edgar when it stated that seeking "regulatory
approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce." Id. at 582 (citing Edgar,457 U.S. at 642). Thus, the shareholder approval
model is not an example of direct state regulation of interstate commerce; rather, it regulates corporations and allows shareholder voting, which may have an effect on interstate
commerce. It should be considered at most an indirect regulation.
204. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1648-49.
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lar state. The fact that most offerors tend to be out-of-state corporations is unimportant given the evenhanded regulation of the
models, which imposes no greater burden on nonresidents than on
residents.
The Court in CTS Corp. had little difficulty concluding that the
Indiana statute would not adversely affect interstate commerce by
subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations. Most of the second- and third-generation statutory models, such as the Indiana
statute, use the nexus of the state of incorporation and consequently should "not create an impermissible risk of inconsistent
regulation"2 5 because corporations do not incorporate in more
than one state. As the Court in CTS Corp. indicated, "so long as
each state regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has
created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one
State. ' 206 The enactment of the fourth-generation statutes, in
which certain states are attempting to regulate corporations that
have a significant presence in the state but are incorporated elsewhere, raises the possibilities of inconsistent regulation and
whether the Court will apply only the law of incorporation.0 7
The majority opinion in CTS Corp. raises significant questions
about the interplay between the commerce clause and state corporate law. Although the Court did only minimal balancing, it probably has not abandoned that test.2 0 In balancing the benefits of the
regulation with the burdens, several questions arise. First, in balancing, is the role of the incorporating state the significant factor
or should that law also benefit shareholders? Second, can other
states constitutionally regulate corporations incorporated in another state?

205. Id. at 1649.
206. Id.
207. This issue is discussed in pt. IV.B.2.b. infra.
208.

Contra Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and

Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) ExtraterritorialState Legislation, 85 MICH. L.
REv. 1865 (1985).
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1. Balancing
a. The Role of the IncorporatingState
The Court's discussion of the commerce clause and state corporate law suggests a hands-off approach to the second- and thirdgeneration statutes, even if these statutes burden interstate commerce because of their potential to hinder tender offers and the
market for corporate control. Most of the Court's discussion of the
commerce clause in CTS Corp. focused on the importance of state
corporate law. That law necessarily affects interstate commerce,
but according to the Court, the trading market, which facilitates
the participation of shareholders and provides capital for corporations, "depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in the rarest situations-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the
corporate law of the State of its incorporation." 209 The Court's
commerce clause analysis in CTS Corp. rested heavily on the notion that state corporate law is important in both the creation of
corporations and their governance.2 10 The Court indicated that
"[n]o principle of corporate law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations. ....

,21I Although the opinion appeared to make a strong

statement in support of state law, and particularly the law of the
209. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1650. The Court gives examples of state laws that directly
affect corporate transactions that are interstate in character, such as voting requirements on
mergers or dissenters' rights statutes that give shareholders the right to "fair value" if they
vote against certain fundamental transactions such as mergers. Id.
210. Although the primary focus of the Court's opinion on the preemption issue was investor protection, the Court did recognize the "longstanding prevalence of state regulation
in this area." Id. at 1648. See also id. at 1647 n.9 (fiduciary duty issues are a state law
concern).
211. Id. at 1649. The Court quotes Chief Justice Marshall's definition of the corporation
as follows:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or

as incidental to its very existence.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 514, 636 (1819), cited in
CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649. But cf. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978) (restricting the ability of a state to limit the free speech rights of the corporation
because of the needs of the listeners). Interestingly, the Court in CTS Corp. cites the dissent
by Justice Rehnquist in Bellotti, which emphasized the role of the state in the creation of
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state of incorporation, it also indicated that the Indiana statute
was intended to protect the shareholders.212
The Court's emphasis on the role of the state in creating corporations was significant in its commerce clause analysis. The Court
afforded a strong presumption in favor of state corporate law that

burdens interstate commerce. 2 13 This presumption lessened the

Court's traditional inquiry of nondiscriminatory indirect state regulation, which balanced the burdens of the legislation with the
"putative" local benefits.211 In CTS Corp., the Court did minimal
balancing and found that the state has an interest in promoting
the "stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs.

' 21 5

The Court

emphasized that the Indiana statute promoted these interests and
even protected shareholders by allowing collective action to avoid
coercive takeovers.2 1 6 The burdens of the Illinois takeover statute

on the market for corporate control present in Edgar217 received
corporations. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1650 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822-24 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).

212. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
213. In the past, the Court has given the safety concerns of states significant deference
when states were regulating interstate highways. See South Carolina Highway Dept. v Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177 (1938). This deference derived from the lack of discrimination and a
recognition that the states are primarily responsible for the construction and maintenance
of the highways. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1977). The
Court no longer seems to give the same deference to the states in highway regulation. See
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). This change of attitude provides an interesting parallel with the Court's view in CTS Corp. of state regulation of corporate governance. In CTS Corp., the strong support of state corporate law appears to be
similar to the Court's earlier approach to state regulation of highways because state regulation of corporate governance creates no discrimination and the states have primary responsibility in creating the corporation and the relationships involved.
214. The Court did not even cite its opinion in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970), which provides the often quoted test on balancing. The Court does not seem to have
abandoned its balancing test, as suggested by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in CTS
Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1653 (Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, it seems to be giving greater deference to the state to regulate a state-created entity.
215. CTS Corp., 107 5. Ct. at 1651.
216. Id. The Court dismissed the argument that the prospect of coercive tender offers was
illusory and found the state's concern not groundless. Id.
217. Compare the strong support in Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-44, for the benefits of the
market for corporate control with the Court's position in CTS Corp.:
It is appropriate to note when discussing the merits and demerits of tender
offers that generalizations usually require qualification. No one doubts that
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little attention in CTS Corp. According to the Court, Indiana's
concern with coercive tender offers was not groundless and states
'218
were not required to adopt any "particular economic theory.

Thus, the states have a role to play in tender offers and in regulating the market for corporate control.2 19 According to the Court, as
long as the statute did not prohibit offers, purchases, or attempts
to gain control and provided residents and nonresidents with equal
access, the state's imposition of limitations on tender offers did not
mean the law was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 20
The Court's strong support for state corporate law suggests that
all the second- and third-generation models, including the Delaware law, 21 should pass muster under the rationale of CTS Corp.
because they all require the state of incorporation as a nexus. How
the Court in CTS Corp. views the corporation and the purpose of
corporate law is unclear. Initially, the Court strongly emphasized
the role of the states as creators of these entities. The Court also
looked to corporate law's promotion of stability of those who are
involved in the corporation to justify the regulation. It went on to
characterize the Indiana statute as one that protected investors
and provided for their effective voice. Which view predominates
may be significant in a future analysis of the various takeover
222
statutes.

some successful tender offers will provide more effective management or other
benefits such as needed diversification. But there is no reason to assume that
the type of conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers
necessarily will result in more effective management or otherwise be beneficial
to shareholders. The divergent views in the literature-and even now being
debated in the Congress-reflect the reality that the type and utility of tender
offers vary widely. Of course, in many situations the offer to shareholders is
simply a cash price substantially higher than the market price prior to the
offer.
CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651 n.13.
218. CTS Corp., 107 S.Ct. at 1651.
219. The Court in CTS Corp. "rejected the 'notion that the Commerce Clause protects
the particular structure or methods of operations in a.

.

.market. . .

.'

Similarly, the very

commodity that is traded in the 'market for corporate control'-the corporation-is one
that owes its existence and attributes to state law." Id. at 1652 (citation omitted).
220. Id.
221. Some language in the CTS Corp. opinion arguably limits Delaware's ability to enact
a takeover statute. See infra text accompanying notes 301-303.
222. The cases raised the issue of how the corporation should be viewed under the commerce clause. If the corporation is viewed as a separate, artificial entity, the state that regu-
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If protection of investors is the key issue under the commerce
clause, then arguably some of the statutory models may not be
viewed as protecting investors. This could lessen the state's interests compared to the burdens on tender offers. Some of the state
takeover statutes can be viewed as consistent with Indiana's attempt to protect investors. The shareholder approval22 3 and second-tier models are designed to avoid coercive tender offers and
allow collective shareholder action, a factor that the Court found
significant in upholding Indiana's voting rights model in CTS
Corp. The share redemption model further protects shareholders
from coercive tender offers by increasing their rights to participate
in the tender offer premium. None of these models denies access to
control of the corporation; instead, each provides regulatory procedures to protect shareholder interests. Although the full-disclosure
model permits a state agency to enjoin a takeover in that state, it
provides for disclosure to protect investors and in this respect is
similar to other permissible state regulation of intrastate securities.
The fiduciary duty and business combination models give increased power to the board to deal with the tender offer. As discussed previously in the preemption section of this Article, the fiduciary duty and business combination models do not involve the
shareholders directly. In addition, these models often were enacted
to protect interests beyond those of the shareholders. If, however,
investor protection is the significant issue under the commerce
clause then these models may be subject to attack because they
arguably do not protect investors.
Protection of investors should not be the significant issue in a
commerce clause analysis, however, because the Court emphasized
the role of the states in creating corporate relationships. The
Court's discussion of investor protection in CTS Corp. reflected Indiana's announced purpose of protecting shareholders. Thus, in ap-

lates that entity has significant power. If it is viewed as a natural entity, its powers may be
limited, and if it is treated as an aggregate made up of its constituent parts, investor protection may be significant. Cf. Buxbaum, Federalism and Company Law, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1163, 1168 (1984).
223. This model may face problems if the Court decides that only internal affairs type
statutes are subject to the deference accorded state statutes by the Court in CTS Corp.
because the statute deals with transaction in shares, which is not normally covered by the
internal affairs doctrine. See infra note 261.
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plying its balancing test, the Court analyzed whether the statute
reflected those concerns.2 24 Although states may have an incentive
to make law that protects investors, the Constitution does not
mandate such protection. The states create corporations, and their
law usually applies to issues of corporate governance. The states'
policies determine the allocation of power and the interests that
are protected within that framework.
The Court in CTS Corp. found that Indiana was justified in affecting interstate commerce because of the state's interest not only
in protecting shareholders but in "defining the attributes of shares

in its corporations ....

225

The Court was not inclined "to second-

guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility
of legislation. '226 The commerce clause was designed to protect the

interstate market from undesirable local interference,227 not to establish a theory of the firm or insure shareholder autonomy.22 8 The
key question in CTS Corp. was whether corporate law created by
the state of incorporation effectively denied equal access to that
market, especially when what was traded, in this case the corporation and its shares, was created by that law.229

224. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
225. Id. at 1652.
226. Id. at 1651 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679
(1981)) (Brennan, J., concurring). In APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F.
Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985), vacated as moot, No. 85-5346 (8th Cir. Nov. 25, 1985), the
court invalidated Minnesota's shareholder approval model. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment after the case had been settled. According
to the district court, "[t]he Commerce Clause, ,as interpreted by the Supreme Court, requires a court to balance benefits against burdens; not interests against burdens." 622 F.
Supp. at 1221 (emphasis in original). A state's desire to accomplish a certain result is an
interest, but if a statute that is burdensome fails to further the result, there is no benefit.
The state must demonstrate that its legitimate interests are served by the statute. Courts
have "the constitutional duty to determine whether State-desired benefits can, in fact, result from the statute and only those which are not 'speculative' may be placed in the scale
to be balanced against the burden on interstate commerce." Id. Given the minimal balancing and the strong presumption in favor of the legislative judgment in CTS Corp., the
court's commerce clause analysis in Van Dusen Air, Inc. appears to have been rejected at
least in the areas of internal affairs of corporations.
227. L. TRmE, supra note 23, at 407.
228. See Coffee, Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986).
229. See CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
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The Court in CTS Corp. acknowledged that the state has the
right to allocate power within the corporate structure. 30 Consequently, the fact that some of these statutes shift power to the
board of directors should be permissible under the commerce
clause. In addition, this shift of power does not necessarily mean
that shareholders are harmed. For example, the board has the potential power to negotiate a more favorable deal. The shareholders
also have the power to monitor management 2 31 by replacing the
board, bringing an action under fiduciary duty principles, and in
some cases opting out of the statute.
The fact that the fiduciary duty and business combination models may be directed at interests other than those of the shareholders also should not be a problem under the commerce clause. When
New York enacted the first business combination statute, the goal
of the law was to "promote the long-term growth of New York resident domestic corporations."23 2 The legislature was concerned
about highly leveraged takeovers that resulted in the substitution
of debt for equity, which shifted the risk to creditors. According to
the legislative findings, these takeovers
adversely affect employees and communities. They restrict the
ability of the affected businesses to grow, to invest for long-term
return and to provide increased productivity and employment....
New York State has a significant interest in regulating the relationships among or between corporations organized in New
York and their officers, directors and stockholders.233
Moreover, as a major industrial state, New York was intimately
concerned about avoiding the adverse effects that these types of
takeovers might have on the state and its citizens.23 4
230. Id. at 1651.

231. See generally Coffee, supra note 27 (describing the methods provided to monitor
management).

232. MEMORANDUM CH.915, supra note 173.
233. Id. at 3189.
234. Id. at 3190. Although a concern for local industry and communities is a legitimate
state interest, the commerce clause was intended to avoid purposeful economic protectionism by the states. Regan, supra note 202. If the legislation requires the business to remain
in a state, it would be unconstitutional. In fact, however, the statutes do not require businesses or assets to remain in the state. A statute that is motivated by a belief that takeovers
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Although the existence of the problem is unclear, the commerce
clause should not upset the use of state corporate law to protect
these interests, given the strong presumption in favor of state corporate law.2 s5 A statute that protects other nonshareholder interests therefore should not automatically be invalid under the commerce clause. 26 Even if investor protection is the significant issue,
the opinion in CTS Corp. offers little indication of what concept of
investor protection the Court would endorse. As discussed previously, the policy of the Williams Act is to facilitate decisionmaking. Other views of investor protection include complete investor
autonomy or maximizing the power of the board or managers and
are harmful to the local economy does not seem to amount to economic protectionism. Regan, supra note 208, at 1872.
235. Arguably the goal of the legislation is outside the typical internal affairs type statute
and really deals with state economic development. Corporate governance rules have often
been used to deal with a variety of economic concerns beyond protection of shareholders.
For example, a concern for creditors can be found in the legal capital rules of state corporate statutes. See B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL (2d ed. 1981). Many
states used to require a minimum capitalization to incorporate. Id. at 17. These statutes
were designed to protect the public and creditors. Id. But see Langevoort, The Supreme
Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 101 HARv. L. REV. 96, 106-07 (1987) (criticizing the Court for failing to see
that the legislation was not to protect shareholders but to protect Indiana's economic interests, which might be local protectionism). Even if a court were to conclude that protecting
interests outside those of the typical internal affairs statutes-shareholders, officers, and
directors-was not entitled to the same presumption as the Court in CTS Corp. appears to
have given corporate law, the interests protected by the state could then be balanced against
the burdens.
236. The Court indicated that the state has an interest in relationships among the parties
involved in corporations as well as in shareholders. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651. In discussing the shareholder protection provided by the Indiana statute, the Court suggested
that the "possibility of coercion in some takeover bids offers additional justification for
Indiana's decision to promote the autonomy of independent shareholders." Id. at 1651 (emphasis added). In Hyde Park v. Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized that under the CTS Corp. opinion, interests other than
those of the shareholders might be permissible and that it was not clear that the law would
"substantially chill tender offers." 839 F.2d 837, 847 (1st Cir. 1988). Even if the law did chill
tender offers, the court indicated that "it is hard to judge whether the resultant benefits to
state shareholders and to corporate stability would be outweighed by the disadvantages that
would be suffered by those same stockholders and the burdens that would be placed on the
interstate market." Id. Initially the New York statute raised concern for the statute's constitutionality under the commerce clause. See Pinto, supra note 69. Upon further reflection,
the limitation on the role of states in providing corporate law if courts use the commerce
clause to invalidate the takeover statutes became a greater concern. See Pinto, supra note
49. The Court in CTS Corp. expressed this concern.
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allowing considerations of corporate constituencies in addition to
the shareholders. Neither the Williams Act nor the commerce
2 37
clause resolves this debate.
Although the Court found that the Indiana statute protected
shareholders, it should not follow logically that other models that
give power to the board or protect other interests are unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds. These statutes continue to
provide equal access to the corporation and its shares by residents
and nonresidents of the state. They do not preclude a tender offer,
but instead provide a regulatory mechanism that seeks to protect
corporate interests. Under the rationale of CTS Corp., when a
court is faced with a corporate law statute enacted by the state of
incorporation which burdens interstate commerce, the statute
should be presumptively valid given the state's interest in the relationships created.2 88
b.

The Role of a NonincorporatingState

The fact that the state of incorporation has a significant role to
play in regulating its corporations and that its law should be presumptively valid does not mean that the commerce clause mandates that law if another state has also regulated in the same area.
When faced with burdensome inconsistent regulation involving
corporate governance, a court should use the commerce clause to
choose a law, but that law should not automatically be the law of
the state of incorporation.

237.

According to Justice Scalia, whether Indiana's statute benefits shareholders or in-

cumbent management is "a highly debatable question, but it is extraordinary to think that
the constitutionality of the Act should depend on the answer." CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at
1653 (Scalia, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia:
Nothing in the Constitution says that the protection of entrenched management is any less important a "putative local benefit" than the protection of

entrenched shareholders, and I do not know what qualifies us to make that
judgment-or the related judgment as to how effective the present statute is in
achieving one or the other objective-or the ultimate (and the most ineffable)
judgment as to whether, given importance-level x, and effectiveness-level y, the
worth of the statute is "outweighed" by impact-on-commerce z.

Id.
. 238. This presumption could be rebutted by a showing of an excessive burden
on interstate commerce or, in the case of inconsistent regulation, a significant interest of another

state. See infra text accompanying notes 261-300.
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The opinion in CTS Corp. suggests that the fourth-generation
statutes, which provide for regulation that affects tender offers and
do not use the state of incorporation as a nexus, may be unconstitutional. These fourth-generation statutes present two issues. The
first is the potential problem of inconsistent regulation that may
result from these statutes. The second is whether a state can regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations.2 39
If another state regulates the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, a court should not automatically invalidate the regulation
under the commerce clause. If the statute burdens interstate commerce, the benefits should be balanced with the burdens. If the
incorporating state has regulated in the area, the fourth-generation
statute may create inconsistent regulation with the law of the state
of incorporation, and this inconsistency may impermissibly burden
interstate commerce. In that case, the balancing test takes on a
new dimension. The courts should recognize the importance of the
internal affairs doctrine as representing an interest of the incorporating state in the corporate relationships it creates. Given the importance of the state of incorporation in creating the corporation
and establishing governance rules affecting the relationships created, that law would be presumptively valid in the face of inconsistent regulation of another state.
i. Inconsistent Regulation
In CTS Corp., the Court indicated that it has applied the commerce clause to invalidate statutes that subject activities to inconsistent regulation.2 40 Because the fourth-generation statutes were
enacted after the CTS Corp. decision, the Court in CTS Corp.
never addressed the problem of multiple state regulations in corpo-

239. On the internal affairs doctrine, see Demott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48 LAw & COrNEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 161 (1985). The Maryland Supreme Court provided a widely accepted definition of internal affairs:
[W]here the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as
a member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder, director, president,
or other officer, and is the act of the corporation, whether acting in stockholders' meeting, or through its agents, the board of directors, then such action is
the management of the internal affairs of the corporation. ...
North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (1885).
240. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
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rate governance. The concerns raised by these statutes are the
problem of inconsistent regulation and its effect on interstate
commerce. 24 '
In CTS Corp. the Court appeared to treat inconsistent regulation as an independent ground for automatic invalidation under
the commerce clause, thereby precluding any balancing test. The
Court, however, has not abandoned its traditional approach of balancing the benefits with the burdens when faced with inconsistent
regulation as long as the regulation is not direct or discriminatory.2 42 Of the cases cited in the CTS Corp. opinion that dealt with
inconsistent regulation, those that did not involve balancing involved regulations that raised particular commerce clause
problems.24 3 In some cases the Court found direct state regulation,244 which per se violates the commerce clause. Other cases involved interstate transportation, an area that requires a uniform
system of regulations.24 5

241. Justice Scalia in his concurrence indicated, "As long as a State's corporation law
governs only its own corporations and does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it
." Id. at 1653 (Scalia,
should survive this Court's scrutiny under the Commerce Clause ...
J., concurring). This suggests that the state of incorporation is primary but does not preclude other states' regulation, which could be subject to the traditional balancing approach.
242. Contra Regan, supra note 208. Prior to CTS Corp., Professor Regan argued that in
cases involving the movement of goods, the Court should not balance, but should focus on
purposeful economic protectionism. Regan, supra note 202. In his subsequent article, he
views CTS Corp. as supporting his argument against balancing. Regan, supra note 208.
243. The Court in CTS Corp. cited Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662 (1981), as a case in which a statute was invalidated because of inconsistent regulation.
CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649. The Court in Kassel was faced with an Iowa law that restricted the size of trucks using its highway. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665-66. The law differed
from that of other states, and the Court balanced the benefits and the burdens. The Court
found the state's safety interest to be illusory and a significant impairment to the federal
interest in an efficient and safe highway system. Id. at 671.
244. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573
(1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1980) (plurality opinion) (discussing
direct burden on interstate commerce).
245. For example, the Court in CTS Corp. cited its 1851 opinion in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, in which a Pennsylvania law was held unconstitutional because it required ships
entering or leaving the Port of Philadelphia to use a local pilot. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at
1649 (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)). In Cooley, the
Court indicated that when a power is exercised by the states, which "are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system,. . ." the states cannot regulate. 53 U.S. at
319. The Court also cited Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (cited in CTS
Corp. 107 S. Ct. at 1649). In that case, the Court again found a situation that dictated a
uniform system. The Court found an Arizona law that limited the size of trains had the
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The cases involving inconsistent regulation expressed a concern
with both the need for uniformity and the problems of extraterritoriality-one state controlling commerce beyond its borders. 246
The Court traditionally has used the commerce clause to accommodate the competing demands of state interests versus national
interest.2 47 The usual result when national interests prevail is the
invalidation of the particular state law.
The Court, however, traditionally has not used the commerce
clause to arbiter directly between two state laws by mandating one
state's law as the provider of a uniform system.248 What would be
the justification for the Court mandating only the law of the state
of incorporation over all other states without applying a balancing
test? Is the corporation and the regulation of the actors within it

practical effect of extending the regulation beyond its borders and interfered with the need
for a uniform rail system. Id. at 775.
246. See Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. 761 (practical effect of one state setting minimum
standards is to control commerce beyond its boundaries); Edgar,457 U.S. 624 (Illinois takeover statute invalidated for its "sweeping extraterritorial effect"). The Court in Edgar
stated that "if Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other states; and interstate
commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly stifled."
Id. at 642.
Professor Regan also views the Court's discussion of inconsistent regulation in CTS Corp.
as possibly implicating a concern for the extraterritorial effect of the legislation. Regan,
supra note 208, at 1875-84. Professor Regan has argued that the Court should abandon the
balancing test. He would allow the state of incorporation to export its law based on a territorial assumption that the internal affairs are located in that state and thus another state
cannot regulate that activity. He views the Court's opinion in CTS Corp. as possibly based
on the idea that the share attributes dealt with by Indiana's statute are located in the state
of incorporation. Id. at 1877-78. Another state's attempt to regulate the effects of the behavior through regulation of the activity located in another state is extraterritorial. Id. at 1899.
This lack of balancing is formalistic, however, and ignores the possibility of a strong state
interest in the internal affairs of basically local corporations incorporated elsewhere. Using
his basic analysis, one could argue that the state's creation of the entity and the relationships gives the state a significant interest to protect which must be balanced with the interests of other states. See infra text accompanying notes 288-300.
247. Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 768-69.
248. But cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating a law
that required trucks to use mudguards was out of line with the requirements of other states
and thus the law interfered with interstate transportation). The decision in Bibb suggests
that by invalidating a law that differs from that of other states, the Court may choose one
state's law to provide a uniform system. In Bibb, the Court could have invalidated all state
laws under the rationale of Cooley, but instead it dealt only with the Illinois statute involved in the case before it. The invalidation of one law while others were left intact did not
mean that those laws would not still be subject to balancing if the Court were faced with
those statutes.
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so different from other multistate dealings or so important to our
national economy as to require a constitutional mandate of the law
of the state of corporation? No one would suggest that because the
corporation owes its existence to the state, that state has the right
to dictate its law whenever the corporation enters into multistate
commercial transactions.2 49 Even if the Court concludes that this
issue involves an area of national importance, such as transportation, this does not mean an end to balancing or to the automatic
application of the law of one state over another. 50 In fact, uniformity of state laws and a federal corporate law may be preferable
for multistate corporations. However, given its strong statement of
support for state corporate law in CTS Corp., the Court is unlikely
to invalidate all state corporate laws that burden interstate commerce to achieve uniform treatment in takeovers.2 5 1 Of course, diversity in regulation is a byproduct of our federal system and does
not always result in a constitutional issue.252 Courts could take several approaches when faced with these fourth-generation statutes.

249. For example, the burdens of multistate taxation could be solved by allowing the
state of incorporation to dictate taxation. No one has suggested that this burden should be
remedied by mandating this result under the commerce clause. In fact, the Court in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), recognizing the problem of multistate firms,
indicated that the commerce clause does not prohibit overlap in the computation of taxable
income. The Court held that it was best left to Congress and not to the Court to prescribe a
uniform rule. Id. at 278-80.
250. See Regan, supra note 202, at 1182-85.
251. One can argue that Delaware is creating an extraterritorial effect by exporting its law
to other states that may in fact have a more significant relationship to the corporation. If a
uniform system is needed, then all state corporate law that burdens interstate commerce
should be invalidated under the rationale of Cooley. Cf. Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law-A
Proposalfor a National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
303 (1986). According to Professor Fiflis, in discussing the Unocal Corp. case, which dealt
with takeover defenses, "[o]ne may properly ask whether it is appropriate for Delaware,
which conceivably may not be the abode of a single Unocal shareholder, to fix national
policy in an international securities market, while Congress and the federal courts, Nerolike, abdicate a policymaking role." Id. at 306. Given the strong support for the state of
incorporation in CTS Corp., the Court probably would not take that approach. This support
for state corporate law could become less deferential, which appears to be what happened in
the Court's changing attitude toward state regulation of highways.
252. Regan, supra note 208, at 1885. Professor Regan has argued that the opinion in CTS
Corp. discussing inconsistent regulation appears to be concerned with extraterritoriality.
Professor Regan believes that the extraterritoriality issue should not be an issue under the
dormant commerce clause but recognizes that it was important to the decision in CTS Corp.
Id. at 1873-79.
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The courts could avoid the risk of inconsistent regulation by
adopting the notion of "lex incorporatonis, 215 by rejecting any balancing of interests,254 or by claiming the nonincorporating state
has no legitimate interest. The courts could also determine that a
uniform system is necessary, as the Supreme Court has done in
some cases involving transportation, and that the states cannot
regulate effectively in that area.2 55 The courts should analyze each
statute to determine if in fact inconsistent regulation existed, and
if so it could balance the burdens with the benefits.25 The fourthgeneration statutes may not create inconsistent regulation.25 The
fact that an incorporating state has chosen a different regulatory
model than another state attempting to apply its law to the same
253. See Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1; see also Reese &
Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full
Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958) (arguing that the law of the state of incorporation should apply in most cases with very limited exceptions).
254. Professor Regan has argued against balancing in the dormant commerce clause, and
he sees CTS Corp. as confirming his view. Regan, supra note 208, at 1866-68.
255. Regan, supra note 202, at 1182-85.
256. According to Gunther:
[T]he modern Court is not likely to invalidate a state law merely because it
creates a risk of multiple inconsistent burdens, because other states might enact conflicting laws in the same area. Rather, as in Bibb, the Court is likely to
insist on a showing that actual inconsistent burdens exist.
G. GUNTHER, supra note 22, at 254-55. Contra TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., No.
87-2056-R (W.D. Okla. Nov. 3, 1987). In TLX Acquisition Corp., the district court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of Oklahoma's voting rights statute, which applied to Telex,
a Delaware corporation with a presence in Oklahoma. The court found the statute facially
unconstitutional because it created an impermissible risk of inconsistent state regulation of
voting rights and also because the statute's burdens outweighed the legitimate interests of
Oklahoma. Id., slip op. at 28. Although it was argued that in fact there was no inconsistent
regulation because at the time Delaware had no conflicting law and no evidence of a state
having a greater interest than Oklahoma was presented, the court concluded that when a
state regulated voting rights of foreign corporations there was "an impermissible risk of
inconsistent regulations." Id., slip op. at 20. The court acknowledged that the Supreme
Court usually invalidated inconsistent regulation when faced with actual inconsistent statutes. The district court, however, found no actual conflict, and instead relied on the language in CTS Corp., in which the Supreme Court discussed inconsistent regulation and indicated that the Indiana statute "does not create an impermissible risk of inconsistent
regulation by different States." Id., slip op. at 22 (quoting CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649).
257. Cf. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 2 (1981) (discussing the
issue of false conflicts in interest analysis under choice of law principles). See generally
Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 6 VAND. L. REv. 433, 476-77
(1973) (imposing the law of several states may create not conflict but compatible
cumulation).
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corporation does not necessarily create inconsistent regulation for
the corporation.25 8 The statutory models, if viewed as protective of
shareholders or even of other interests, would not necessarily create a conflict if the policies that underlie them were similar or not
viewed as inconsistent.2 59
If in fact the enactment of the fourth-generation statutes creates
burdensome inconsistent regulation, the remedy may be invalidation under the commerce clause. For example, if states enact laws
or have a policy encouraging hostile takeovers and other states
have laws that restrict them, contradictory regulation exists. In addition, if the net result of these statutes is to impose multiple and
costly regulation, they may create a cumulative burden.26 0 The
courts probably will continue to analyze these fourth-generation
statutes, which are not discriminatory or direct regulation of interstate activities, by first determining if they impermissibly burden
interstate commerce. If they do not, then the issue is whether these

258. Cf. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1984). In Norlin
Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not apply the law of
Panama, the country of incorporation, but applied New York law since the conflict was
illusory because it was unclear whether Panama would apply its law to the transaction. See
infra note 281.
259. Two statutes may be viewed as complementary in protecting the same interests. For
example, Oklahoma adopted a voting rights statute that required the corporation to have
either its principal place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets in Oklahoma
as well as either more than 10% of the shareholders residing in Oklahoma, more than 10%
of its shares owned by residents, or 10,000 shareholder residents. 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 146, § 18 (West). Delaware's takeover statute is a modified business combination model
that places power in the hands of the board and allows for a two-thirds vote by the disinterested shareholders to avoid the limitations on future business combinations. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (1988). These different statutes have similar purposes-protection of shareholders-and may be viewed as consistent. Even if the statutes are protecting different interests
they still may be consistent. For example, the Oklahoma statute is also protecting state
interests in a corporation with significant number of assets and employees in the state. This
protection of other interests does not necessarily create a conflict if the application of the
statutes does not undermine the particular interests of the states involved. If there is inconsistency then the court should balance the benefits and burdens.
260. Professor Tribe notes that a "potent localizing bias" develops when individual state
regulations operate in the aggregate against interstate commerce. See L. TRIBE, supra note
23, at 434. By making the conduct of commercial activity that is confined to a single state
easier and more profitable than multistate commercial activity, this bias discourages the
development of national enterprise. Id. It is not clear that given the nexus requirements of
the statutes, no more than two states will be involved. Professor Tribe has indicated that in
cases of actual conflict, the Supreme Court "has been extremely severe in its scrutiny of
state action." Id. at 435.
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statutes in fact create inconsistent regulation. If an inconsistency
exists, the courts should subject the regulation to the balancing
test.
ii. Internal Affairs Doctrine
The decision in CTS Corp. implicitly raised questions concerning the role of choice of law principles-and particularly the internal affairs doctrine, which applies the law of the state of incorporation to corporate governance issues-in commerce clause
analysis. 261 The Court in CTS Corp. implicitly adopted the view
261. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Court seemed to give some weight
to the use of the internal affairs doctrine in commerce clause analysis. The Court indicated
that the Illinois statute was not an internal affairs statute because it applied to foreign
corporations and that the law regulated the transfer of shares, which traditionally is outside
the internal affairs doctrine. Id. at 640. Interestingly, in CTS Corp. the Court's only reference to the Second Restatement of Conflicts and the internal affairs doctrine is in its short
discussion of inconsistent regulation and not in its discussion of balancing. CTS Corp., 107
S. Ct. at 1649. In CTS Corp., the Court emphasized the role of the state in regulating its
corporations and protecting investors. The Court's failure to discuss the internal affairs doctrine may not be important, however, because Indiana's voting rights model dealt with an
issue normally covered by the doctrine.
Professor Buxbaurm argues that CTS Corp. should not be viewed as constitutionalizing
the "state of incorporation" version of the internal affairs doctrine under the commerce
clause, which would be the "Delawarization" of state corporate law. Buxbaum, The
Threatened Constitutionalizationof the Internal Affairs Doctrine in CorporationLaw, 75
CALI. L. REv. 29, 34-35 (1987). Generally the internal affairs doctrine is not implicated in
transactions involving shares. The use of the internal affairs doctrine in commerce clause
analysis may cause problems for the shareholder approval model, however. This model involves shareholders in the tender offer process by allowing them to *act collectively in approving a tender offer and also uses the state of incorporation as a nexus. It prohibits the
purchase of shares unless approved in advance by the shareholders. Although arguments can
be made that this model is similar to Indiana's statute in protecting shareholders, it is not a
typical internal affairs statute, even though it involves voting rights, because it denies an
offering shareholder the right to buy and individual shareholders the right to sell without
collective shareholder approval. According to the Second Restatement of Conflicts:
It should be added that certain issues which are peculiar to corporations or to
other organizations do not affect matters of organic structure or internal administration and need not, as a practical matter, be governed by a single law.
An example is the transfer of individual shares of a share issue. There is no
practical reason, for example, why a corporation incorporated in state X should
not comply with the requirements of state Y when it seeks to sell its shares in
the latter state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICr OF LAws § 302 comment e (1971). This was one of
the reasons the Court in Edgar found that Illinois had no interest in the internal affairs
because its statute applied to transactions in shares. In APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen
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that the internal affairs doctrine should be a significant factor in
determining whether state corporate law impermissibly interferes
with interstate commerce because states have an interest in the internal affairs of corporations. 2 In most cases, the use of the doctrine will support the goals of the commerce clause by providing a
single rule of law, which facilitates multistate commercial transactions. 23 However, this reasoning should not apply automatically to
Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (1985), the court indicated, in finding Minnesota's shareholder
approval model unconstitutional, that "[tihere is little doubt that a state has some constitutionally sanctioned right to govern the internal affairs of its corporations." Id. at 1223. The
court found the doctrine inapplicable, however, because the shareholder approval model involves the "[r]egulation of shareholders-and those who would become shareholders-[which] is not the same as regulating the corporation itself." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Court in CTS Corp. neither rejected nor adopted the implications of Edgar that only
an internal affairs type statute would create an important state interest because the Indiana
law was a typical internal affairs type statute that involved voting rights. According to the
Court, "No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a
State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the

voting rights of shareholders." CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 304. The question remains whether the Court's emphasis on the
state of incorporation, which created the corporation, as having a significant interest in regulating corporate governance meant that the internal affairs doctrine would not be the only
significant factor.
Professor Shipman has argued for a broader view of internal affairs to cover statutes that
affect tender offers because these offers have a significant impact on the corporation and
shareholders. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The
Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 740-61 (1970). Thus the ability of the
shareholder approval model to withstand attack may depend on whether the Court in CTS
Corp. meant that all state corporate law of the state of incorporation would be valid or that
only matters covered by the traditional view of the internal affairs doctrine would be upheld. Even under the internal affairs doctrine, the law of state of incorporation "has usually
been applied in the absence of an explicitly local statute." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 302 comment e.

262. See Pinto, supra note 49, for the argument that the Court should be wary of using
the commerce clause to upset state corporate law and the internal affairs doctrine because it
normally provides for a single law, because it encourages the market for corporate charters,
which in some commentators' view enhances shareholder wealth, and because it is consistent
with the view that corporate law is more contractual than regulatory. Id. at 489-96. The
fourth-generation statutes will interfere with the single-law principle only when the courts
do not choose between several laws and there is more than one law to contend with. The
market for corporate charters depends on both the state's ability to export its law and the
investors' ability to choose that law. In those cases in which the fourth-generation statutes
apply over the state of incorporation, this principle may be viewed as limiting that market
and affecting the contracting by the investors.
263. See Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARv. L. REV. 806, 819 (1971).
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all cases. The courts should consider the incorporating state's interest when balancing the interests of the nonincorporating state's
regulation.
Arguably, the Court in Edgar and CTS Corp. has mandated the
use of the law of the state of incorporation. In Edgar, the statute
was held unconstitutional because Illinois attempted to regulate
foreign corporations. 26' The Court indicated broadly that a "State
has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders.
Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there
is nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law."2 5 In
CTS Corp. the Court accepted that statement but limited its effect
to states that attempt to protect "nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations."6 On its face, this statement appears to
give the state of incorporation the only role in protecting shareholders. This severely restricts the ability of states to regulate foreign corporations.
The strong support for state corporate law in CTS Corp. should
not be interpreted broadly to preclude state regulation of foreign
corporations by fourth-generation statutes. The Court in CTS
Corp. contrasted the Indiana statute with the Illinois law in Edgar
26
' 1 The Illinois statin order to limit the broad language of Edgar.
ute was potentially applicable if no shareholders resided in Illinois.
Such an application is significantly different from that of the
fourth-generation statutes. Although a state may have no interest
in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations,
it should be able to protect resident shareholders of nonresident
corporations when a significant number of shareholders reside in
the state. 268 Thus, in analyzing the state's interests in the fourth-

264. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). The Court in Edgar stated that
"Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations." Id. at 64546. Interestingly, the corporation was incorporated in Illinois with 27% of the shareholders
being Illinois residents. Id. at 642.
265. Id. at 644.
266. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651 (emphasis in original).
267. In Edgar, the Court stated that "Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal
affairs of foreign corporations." 457 U.S. at 645-46. The Court previously had pointed out
that the Illinois statute applied with only 10% resident shareholders and corporations not
incorporated in the state and having no principal place of business in the state. Id.
268. In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961),
the California court was faced with a Delaware corporation that had its executive office in
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generation statutes, if the intent of the statute is investor protection then the presence of shareholders should be significant." 9
In enacting statutes that apply to foreign corporations, the state
may also be using an internal affairs type regulation to protect interests other than those of resident shareholders. States enact
these fourth-generation statutes because of fears of the detrimental effects often associated with hostile takeovers. These interests
are entitled to some weight in balancing the benefits with the burdens on interstate commerce. These interests carry less weight,
however, if they represent local protectionism that unduly restricts
the interstate transfer of property. 7 0
Although the Court historically has deferred to the law of the
state of incorporation on issues involving internal affairs,2 71 that
does not mean that the Court has established a constitutional requirement under the commerce clause mandating that the law of

California, conducted a predominant amount of its business in California (60% of its wages
and salaries were paid to California employees), and had 30% of its stock owned by California residents. The Commissioner of Corporations had ruled that the elimination of cumulative voting, which was permissible in Delaware but not allowed in California, was unfair and
that the corporation was subject to California regulation. Id. at 403-04, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
The District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's determination that Delaware law
applied and stressed the local nature of the contacts involved. Id. at 413-15, 12 Cal. Rptr. at
728-29. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 253 (criticizing the result in Sobieski).
269. On issues of fiduciary duty the application of the law of the state of incorporation is
less compelling and the state with a significant number of shareholders may have a stronger
interest. Kozyris, supra note 253, at 64.
270. In a case decided before CTS Corp., the United States District Court for the West'ern District of Missouri invalidated Missouri's shareholder approval statute, which applied
to corporations that were not incorporated in Missouri but had significant contacts with the
state, on constitutional grounds. Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Interestingly, the court did not rely on the fact that Missouri was attempting to regulate a foreign corporation. First, the court found the statute to be a direct burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 1415. Second, in balancing the court found no requirement of any shareholder
residing in the state, nor was the purported economic benefit to the state assured by the
statute. According to the court, "It is difficult to discern the rational basis for concluding
that incumbent management will protect the economic interests of Missouri if there is a
conflict with management's interests, or with the economic interests of the corporation." Id.
at 1417. This finding of a lack of rational basis will make it difficult to argue that the fourthgeneration statutes are justifiable in protecting interests other than those of shareholders.
But cf. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 837 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1988).
271. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court emphasized that corporations are creatures of state law and that "except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation." Id. at 84.
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the state of incorporation be applied on all corporate governance
issues. Courts generally have assumed that the law of the state of
incorporation governed, especially if internal affairs issues were
raised, but that should not mandate its use under the commerce
clause. This assumption developed because states historically have
limited their regulation of corporate governance to corporations
that are incorporated in the state.2 72
The constitutional underpinnings to the choice of the state of
incorporation's law traditionally have been the full faith and credit
clause27 3 and to a lesser extent the due process clause.2 74 In Order
of United Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe,275 the Supreme Court
used the full faith and credit clause to mandate a choice of law rule
for a fraternal corporation that selected the law of the state of incorporation. Although some have argued that this decision is lim272. Section 106 of the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1971) indicates that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate the organization or
the internal affairs of such corporation." Several states that follow the Model Act have not
enacted this provision, however. DeMott, supra note 239, at 163-64. Some states, most notably New York and California, have specific statutory provisions that apply to foreign corporations doing business in those states. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW art. 13 (McKinney 1986); CAL.
CORP. CODE: § 2115 (West 1987). See generally Baraf, The Foreign Corporation-AProblem
in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 219 (1966) (discussing New York's law);
Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations-Trampling Upon the
Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 85 (1977) (discussing California's statute).
273. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." See Buxbaum, supra note 261, at 1133, arguing that the jurisprudence of the full faith and credit
clause requires application in commerce clause analysis. See also Reese & Kaufman, supra
note 253, arguing that full faith and credit clause is best suited to require the use of the law
of the state of incorporation if the interests of another state are not seriously affected and
the circumstances concern a legal area requiring regulation by a single law. The authors
recognize the difficult problem when a single law is needed and states other than the state of
incorporation have significant interests to protect. They suggest that when the laws are similar in policy and are intended to protect shareholders and creditors, then another state's
law will not be invalid. If not, the only time the law of another state should apply is when
that state has an "extremely close connection with the corporation and unusually important
policy of its own to protect." Id. at 1144. The authors suggested that the commerce clause
could possibly serve as a constitutional mandate for use of the state of incorporation, but
they indicated that "the commerce clause has not been used as a basis for laying down
constitutional rules of choice of law and would seem a less likely candidate for such a role."
Id. at 1129 n.42.
274. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 prohibits the states from depriving persons of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." See generallyL. BRILmAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYsTEM ch. 9 (1986).
275. 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
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ited to fraternal organizations and no longer reflects the Court's
current thinking on full faith and credit,2 7 6 its holding arguably is
2 77
revived under the commerce clause by the decisions in Edgar
and CTS Corp. The Court's use of the commerce clause to constitutionalize a choice of law rule that requires only the use of the
state of incorporation, without any reference to another state's interest, appears to run contrary to its recent treatment of choice of
law under the full faith and credit and due process clauses.2 7s In
the choice of law area, the Court has moved away from the traditional vested rights, which focused on territorial factors, to a
broader range of factors 279 and has shown a reluctance to use due
process and full faith and credit to invalidate the forum's law when
that state has significant contacts.28 0
In McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 2 8 l the Supreme Court of Delaware
recently reviewed the arguments concerning the use of the internal

276. E.g., Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV.
433, 445-47 (1968). In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the Court referred to
Wolfe as "a highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts." Id. at 183. See
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 596 (1953).
277. See Kozyris, supra note 253, at 35.
278. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981), the Court indicated that
"[i]n deciding constitutional choice-of-law questions, whether under the Due Process Clause
or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this Court has traditionally examined the contacts of
the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the occurrence or transaction
giving rise to the litigation."
279. See generally L. BRILMAYER, supra note 274, ch. 7 (discussing evolution of choice of
law principles).
280. Id. at 287-88. In Allstate InsuranceCo., the Court appeared to allow a state to apply
its law as long as a significant contact or aggregation of contacts created a state interest
"such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 449 U.S. at 31213. Subsequently, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the Court looked
at the fairness of applying a state's law to a nationwide class action in which a majority of
the plaintiffs were out-of-state residents with no idea of which law would apply. "When
considering fairness in this context, an important element is the expectation of the parties."
Id. at 822. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 261 (discussing these cases in light of CTS
Corp.). See also Kogan, Toward A Jurisprudenceof Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness Over Comity, 62 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651 (1987) (arguing that the primary constitutional limitation on choice of law is fairness to the litigants). In terms of fairness one can argue that
there are expectations that the state of incorporation's law will apply, but the use of a significant nexus by the fourth-generation statutes and the ability to opt out may counter the
fairness of applying the law of the state of incorporation.
281. 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987). The issue in the case was which law should determine
whether a Delaware subsidiary of a Panamanian parent corporation could vote the shares of
the parent. Under Delaware law, corporations incorporated in Delaware cannot have their
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affairs doctrine and the power of states to regulate foreign corporations. The court found not only that conflict of law principles dictate the use of the law of the state of incorporation but also that
the Constitution required this under the due process, full faith and
credit, and commerce clauses. 2 ' The court interpreted CTS Corp.
and Edgar as mandating the internal affairs doctrine except in rare
cases.28 3 In addition, the court indicated that full faith and credit,
except in rare circumstances, 284 required the use of the internal affairs doctrine. Because the facts of the case indicated that Delaware had no relationship with the corporation, the result makes
sense. Given Delaware's role as the incorporating state of many

shares voted by a majority-owned subsidiary. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 160(c) (1988). The
court used the internal affairs doctrine to apply Panamanian law. But cf. Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984). This case involved a similar issue of the
ability to vote the shares of a subsidiary where neither corporation was incorporated in New
York. The court, applying New York law, found that Panama probably would not apply its
law and went on to reject the automatic application of the internal affairs doctrine. According to the court:
Norlin's contacts with the State of New York are far from insubstantial. The
company's principal place of business is located within the state, and its board
of directors meets here. The resolution approving the contested stock issuances
were adopted in this state, and the company stock has been traded on the
NYSE. Whether these contacts are sufficient for a New York court to apply
New York law is, in our view, a question that does not lend itself to a simple
answer. We need not, however, grapple with it to resolve the present inquiry.
The principles compelling a forum state to apply foreign law come into play
only when a legitimate and substantial interest of another state would thereby
be served. Conversely, when the interests of only one state are truly involved,
the purported conflict is purely illusory. Thus there is no reason why the law of
the forum state should not control.
Id. at 263-64.
282. McDermott, Inc., 531 A.2d at 218.
283. Id. at 217. The court cited the statements in CTS Corp. that corporations "except in
the rarest situations [are] organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction,
traditionally the corporate law of the state of its incorporation." Id. (quoting CTS Corp.,
107 U.S. at 1649). Tradition, not the Constitution, mandates this result.
284. According to the Delaware court, those rare circumstances occur when "national policy is outweighed by a significant interest of the forum state in the corporation and its
shareholders." McDermott, Inc., 531 A.2d at 218. The national policy appears to relate to
predictability, practicality, and equality, which require a single law. Id. at 218 n.15 (citing
Kozyris, supra note 253, at 34). The emphasis is on giving full faith and credit to the choice
made by the parties. The problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize that the
Court currently views full faith and credit as focusing on whether the state has a significant
state interest such that its choice of law is neither arbitrary or unfair. Allstate Ins. Co., 449
U.S. at 312-13.
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publicly held corporations, the court's declaration of the primacy
of the internal affairs doctrine is not surprising. The decision in
McDermott, Inc. uses the commerce clause to establish the use of a
"lex incorporatonis" without any real balancing of interests. This
rationale would automatically invalidate not only the fourth-generation statutes but also the statutes of states that apply corporate
governance rules to foreign corporations.2 s5
The Delaware court went too far in rejecting the use of a balancing test. Although the internal affairs doctrine usually suggests the
state of incorporation as the proper choice of law, another state
may have a dominant interest. The Second Restatement of Conflicts does not require the use of the law of the state of incorporation in all circumstances because that law is inapplicable in the
unusual case in which another state "has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. 2 8 6 The Delaware
court's suggestion that the Constitution mandates the use of the
law of the state of incorporation is contrary to the Supreme
Court's use of interest analysis. The Delaware court's analysis appears to require the law of the state of incorporation in all cases,
even when the application of another state's law creates no conflict. Even those commentators who have argued for greater use of
the commerce clause in corporate choice of law have not suggested

285. See Kozyris, supra note 253, at 57-76.
286. The Second Restatement of Conflicts provides:
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such
issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971). The comment indicates
that in the absence of an explicitly applicable law, the law of the state of incorporation
should apply. Even if an explicit law exists, its application would be rare. Commentators
have classified corporations according to the extent of their contacts with a state, and they
differ on which state should be able to regulate. The pseudo-foreign corporation does all or
nearly all its business in the state. See Latty, Pseudo-ForeignCorporations,65 YALE L.J.
137 (1955). Other categories include the "technically foreign" corporation, which does approximately 80% of its business within the state, and the "arguably foreign" corporation,
with 50% to 80% of its business in the state. Oldham, Regulating the Regulators:Limitations Upon a State's Ability to Regulate Corporationswith Multi-State Contacts, 57 DEN.
L.J. 345, 353 (1980). See also Kaplan, supra note 276; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 253.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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that the law of the state of incorporation is the only law that
should apply in all cases.2"'
Allowing a state with substantial interests to apply its own law
appears to do little if any harm to interstate commerce. If anything, a rule automatically applying the law of incorporation to sit-

uations in which substantially all the assets and shareholders and
the principal place of business are in one state that is not the state
of incorporation, without any other nexus, would promote form
over substance and abandon any real balancing of interests.28 8
Under a commerce clause analysis, the Court should not choose the
law of a state with no resident shareholders over that of a state
with substantial resident shareholders, especially if the law created
no real conflict or burdens. This result would be particularly ironic
in light of the strong support of state regulation articulated in CTS
Corp.
The commerce clause thus should not mandate the use of the
internal affairs doctrine. If courts are faced with inconsistent or
287. Kozyris, supra note 253, at 55 (arguing for a narrow exception for the pseudo-foreign
corporation with a significant presence in one state). See Horowitz, supra note 263, at 819.
Horowitz writes, "[A]pplication of the commerce clause to require all states to choose the
same single law would not mean that the place of incorporation rule would then become the
constitutionally required choice-of-law doctrine in all cases." Id. He argues for determining
which state has the significant interest based on location of the business. Id.
288. For example, Washington's statute is a business combination model that is intended
to protect Boeing, the largest employer in the state. The legislation requires that the corporation employ more than 20,000 residents, have its primary offices in the state, have a majority of its assets and employees in the state, have more property in the state than elsewhere, and have either 10% of its shareholders as residents or 10% of its shares owned by
residents or more than 5000 shareholders as residents. Washington Takeover Law, supra
note 71. Boeing is incorporated in Delaware, where one would expect it has few assets or
shareholders. Assuming that Washington's law conflicts with that of Delaware, should
Washington's strong interest in its largest private employer carry some weight in balancing
interests with burdens? In a footnote in his concurrence in Edgar,Justice Powell, who wrote
the majority opinion in CTS Corp., wrote:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate
headquarters are transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Management personnel-many of whom have provided
community leadership-may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 n.* (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
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burdensome regulation involving corporate governance rules, they
should recognize the importance of the doctrine in balancing interests under the commerce clause."s The incorporating state's regulation of corporate internal affairs is a significant interest of the
state of incorporation. As the Court in CTS Corp. indicated, the
lower court "failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce
Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law."2 s Because the Court viewed the
incorporating state's interest as important to interstate commerce
because of the state's role in the creation of corporations, another
state's regulation must involve significant interests and benefits to
overcome the burden to interstate commerce of not choosing the
law of the state of incorporation. Thus, the law of the incorporating state should be applied presumptively, with the requirement of
a strong showing by another state that it has a greater interest in
order to rebut the presumption.
In CTS Corp., the Court found that a state "has an interest in
promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters . . . ."I" The Court found that the Indiana
statute furthered that interest. Other states also may have an interest in protecting "parties involved in the corporation" located in
the state, such as substantial shareholders, major assets, a significant number of employees, or a principal place of business.29 2 The
289. In Edgar, the Court discussed the role of the internal affairs doctrine as a conflict of
law principle that avoided a corporation being "faced with conflicting demands." 457 U.S. at
645.
290. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
291. Id. at 1651. In Greenspun v. Lindley, 369 N.Y.S.2d 123, 330 N.E.2d 79 (1975), the
New York Court of Appeals held that the law of Massachusetts applied prima facie to the
question of demand in a derivative suit involving a real estate investment trust incorporated

in that state. Id. at 125, 330 N.E.2d at 80. The court indicated, however:
[W]e reject any automatic application of the so-called 'internal affairs' choiceof-law rule, under which the relationship between shareholders and trustees of
a business trust by strict analogy to the relationship between shareholders and

directors of a business corporation would be governed by the law of the State
in which the business entity was formed.
Id. at 126, 330 N.E.2d at 81. The record did not indicate a "significant association or cluster

of significant contacts.

. . to

support a finding of such 'presence'" in New York. Id. at 125,

330 N.E.2d at 80.

292. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651. The Court goes on to indicate that a state has an
interest "as well in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in
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state of incorporation has its strong presumption because its law
created the corporation. The greater the number or significance of
the corporate interests located in a nonincorporating state, the
greater the weight those interests are to be given in the balancing
test. 3 If the law creates conflict or inconsistency, a greater burden

corporate affairs." Id. Thus, the stability of relations is an interest independent from investor protection.
293. For example, in TLX Acquisition Corp. the court found the Oklahoma fourth-generation statute unconstitutional because of the risk of inconsistent regulation and also because
the statute's burdens on interstate commerce outweighed the state interests in regulation.
TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., No. 87-2056, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 3, 1987).
The court recognized that Oklahoma has an interest in its shareholders and arguably in
corporations with a major economic presence in the state. Id., slip op. at 23-24. The statute
applied to a public corporation with 100 or more shareholders that had either its principal
place of business, its principal office, or substantial assets in Oklahoma, and more than 10%
of its shareholders residing in Oklahoma, more than 10% of its shares owned by residents,
or 10,000 resident shareholders. Id., slip op. at 3 (citing 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 146, § 18).
According to the court, however, the state had no legitimate interest in nonresident shareholders, the internal affairs of foreign corporations, or out-of-state sales of stock. Id., slip op.
at 24. The court found that the statute's denial of voting rights to foreign corporations in
nationwide tender offers or delay of the tender offer was a substantial burden on interstate
commerce compared to the legitimate interests of protecting resident shareholders. Id., slip
op. at 24-25.
Of course, the statutes have to reflect the concerns expressed by the legislature, and in
many cases these fourth-generation statutes may fail to do so. For example, the court in
Van Dusen Air, Inc. recognized that Minnesota had an interest in fostering a habitable
business climate but found that its statute did not clearly meet that interest. APL Ltd.
Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1223 (D. Minn. 1985), vacated as
moot, No. 85-5346 (8th Cir. Nov. 25, 1985). According to the court, Minnesota's statute
"appears to be based upon the questionable assumption that a person who acquires 20% of
the voting stock of a corporation . . is likely to engage in activity that is deleterious to
Minnesota's business climate, such as moving the corporate headquarters or base of operations outside of Minnesota." Id.
In writing about the constitutionality of the New York "business combination model" this
author expressed concern that although the promotion of long-term growth of New York
corporations is a legitimate state interest, it is not clear that its statute will in fact promote
that interest and thus be a benefit that is weighed against the burden on interstate commerce. First, it is not clear that highly leveraged takeovers or hostile takeovers will have an
adverse economic benefit to the corporation, its shareholders, or New York state. In Edgar,
the Court implicitly rejected this idea when it extolled the benefits of takeovers to shareholders and society. Second, all business combinations or share acquisitions by 20% owners
are subject to the statute and the need for board approval, not just highly leveraged transactions or economically harmful transactions. Thus the impact of the statute is overbroad.
Although subsequent acquiror activity is subject to board approval, which is subject to the
business judgment rule, the statute does not appear to limit the board's decisionmaking
process to transactions that are harmful to New York. This appears to permit rejections for
reasons unrelated to the announced purpose of the statute. Third, it is not clear that the
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is required to rebut the presumption of the law of incorporation.
Thus, the more localized the interests, the better the chance that a
state can rebut the presumption.2 4 This approach may fall somewhere between the Court's current approach to choice of law,
which looks to factors such as state interests, fairness to the defendant, and the relationship of the forum to the action, 29 5 and the
position of the Second Restatement of Conflicts, which normally
applies the law of the state of incorporation, except in narrow
circumstances. 9 8
Although courts traditionally do not use the commerce clause to
choose a state law, the practical effect of determining whether a
fourth-generation statute that creates inconsistent regulation impermissibly burdens interstate commerce will be the selection of
that law or the law of state of incorporation.29 7 The selection of a
law in that case by a balancing of interests under the commerce
clause makes sense in the corporate law context. Although the
courts traditionally have looked to state law, and particularly the
law of the state of incorporation, for the rules associated with cor-

state's concerns could not be met with legislation that imposes a lesser impact on interstate
commerce, such as limitations on the use of debt or different state tax policies. Fourth, the
statute is directed at leveraged transactions and hostile takeovers; negotiated transactions
are encouraged by the legislation. This would appear to favor management leveraged
buyouts or freezeouts, which can cause the same problems for New York corporations as
hostile takeovers. The board is not required to be independent and, even if independent, its
relationship with management may preclude truly arms length dealing. Thus management
generally may not be subject to the statute, which may undercut the announced benefit of
the statute. The failure of the Illinois statute in Edgar to include self tenders by a target
was viewed as significant in undermining the justification for the statutory burdens. Pinto,
supra note 69, at 31. The problem of whether the statute accomplishes its purpose is less
important when the corporation is incorporated in the state because of the importance of
state corporate law in creating the relationships, whereas these same concerns may need a
greater level of connection to the law when the state is using its foreign corporate law, such
as the fourth-generation statutes.
294. In Pike, the Court indicated that in determining when a legitimate local purpose is
found, "the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

295. L. BRILMAYER, supra note 274, at 287.
296. Id. at 243.
297. In light of the fourth-generation statutes requirement of a significant presence in the
state, a situation involving more than two states-the state of incorporation and the state
that enacted the fourth-generation statute-will be rare.
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porate governance, this tradition was based to a large degree on
both the failure of other states to act and an earlier view of the
requirements of the full faith and credit clause. Corporations are
important to the nation's economy, and many corporations have a
national presence in terms of both their business activities and
those who invest in the corporation. The need for large economic
actors requires corporations to have access to capital on a national,
if not an international, level.2 9 Although the federal government
has taken a role under federal securities regulation in protecting
the interests of those who invest their capital, the state of incorporation traditionally has regulated in the area of corporate governance with minimal interference from either the federal government
or other states in which the corporation may have a significantly
greater presence.
As the publicly held corporations become larger, they often have
very limited ties to the state of incorporation. This incorporation,
however, creates both the entity and the law that usually applies to
the relationships created. States other than the incorporating state
are now taking a more active role and have enacted the fourthgeneration takeover statutes because they perceive that hostile
takeovers may be harmful to interests in the state.
Because these fourth-generation statutes may create inconsistent
and burdensome regulation and have an extraterritorial reach, the
need to keep interstate commerce free of unreasonable burdens
may be growing. Given the practical problems of a corporation that
tries to meet burdensome inconsistent regulations, the commerce
clause seems an appropriate means of resolving these burdens by
in effect selecting a single law. 29" The fact that many of these

298. In CTS Corp., the Court indicates that "the markets that facilitate this national and
international participation in ownership of corporations are essential for providing capital
not ouly for new enterprises but also established companies that need to expand their businesses." 107 S. Ct. at 1650. See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURrrEs REGULATION 2 (6th
ed. 1987) (citing REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURrrIES MARKETS, HR. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963)), which states that "the trading market unquestionably has an important bearing on the flow of new capital into private enterprise, and thus on the country's
rate of economic growth. The securities markets' vast resources for marshalling the capital
of individual investors all over the world give corporate enterprise access to large sources of
funds that would not otherwise be available."
299. According to Professor Brilmayer, the factors relevant in choice of law include:
(a) The needs of interstate and international systems
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fourth-generation statutes permit the corporation to opt out of the
legal regimen may also be significant in a commerce clause analysis. Because a corporation can choose not to be covered, it can ease
the potential regulatory burden of compliance with multiple regulation. Thus, a corporation may choose uniformity by rejecting the
statutory protection. Consequently, the states have limited the exportation of their law. In practice, however, opting out may not be
easy because the statutes usually require a shareholder vote. 00
c.

Delaware's Potential Problem

When the Court in CTS Corp. discussed a state's ability to regulate foreign corporations, it also questioned the extent to which a
state could regulate the internal affairs of a corporation that was
incorporated in that state but had no other significant nexus to
that state, which could be a problem for Delaware's statute. In
CTS Corp., the Court indicated that Indiana had an interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders because the corporation was
incorporated in the state and because Indiana had an interest in
preventing the corporate form from being used in unfair dealing.30 1
The Indiana statute differed from the Illinois statute in Edgar because Indiana's law applied to corporations with a substantial
number of shareholders residing in the state.3 0 2 According to the
(b) The relevant policies of the forum
(c) The relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of a particular issue
(d) The protection of justified expectations
(e) The basic policies underlying the particular field of law
(f) Certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result.
L. BRILMAYER, supra note 274, at 243. Although these factors may also be relevant to the
commerce clause, the federal interests protected by that clause may involve different policies. Thus in some situations, conflict of law principles may dictate a different result than
the commerce clause would.
300. In TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., No. 87-2056-R (W.D. Okla. Nov. 3, 1987),
the court found that the opt-out provision was itself an internal affairs type statute and that
it created the risk of inconsistent regulation. Slip op. at 23. According to the court, another
state could have enacted a similar but inconsistent law and the corporation might not have
had the time to respond to an acquisition covered by the statute by opting out. Id. But cf.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (the Court refused to apply the law of
the forum because of the unfairness to plaintiff and gave little credence to the ability of a
plaintiff to opt out of the class action).
301. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52.
302. Id. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-4(a)(3) (Burns Supp. 1986).

1988]

STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

Court, "every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has
an interest in protecting."3 03 This discussion in CTS Corp. may indicate that Delaware will not be able to impose a takeover statute
when the number of resident shareholders is insignificant. The
Court's discussion, however, was dictum. It was intended to further
emphasize the difference between the Indiana statute and the Illinois statute that was unconstitutional in Edgar. Consequently,
given the Court's emphasis on the importance of state corporate
law and the corporation as a creature of the state, the lack of a
shareholder nexus in the Delaware statute should not be significant
unless another state can overcome the strong presumption that the
state of incorporation law applies.
2. Private Contracting
The Court left open the question whether the commerce clause
is implicated if the corporation's decision to incorporate in a particular state is really a private decision to choose a state's law. The
Court indicated that it would not consider CTS's contention that
the Indiana statute did not violate the commerce clause regardless
of its burdens "because a corporation's decision to be covered by
the Act is purely 'private' activity beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. ' 30 4 This notion of private activity has two implications. In a broad sense it could mean that for commerce clause
purposes, all state corporate law is contractual in nature, 30 5 but in
a narrower sense it could suggest that the mere act of incorporat303. CTS Corp., 107 S.Ct. at 1652.
304. Id. at 1652 n.14. The fact that the corporations may opt out of the models may also
suggest that the statutes are contractual in nature and not subject to the commerce clause.
305. In discussing corporate statutory provisions that affect both resident and nonresident shareholders, the Court in CTS Corp. also referred to partnership provisions that accomplish similar results. CTS Corp., 107 S.Ct. at 1650 n.12. The Court pointed out that the
Indiana statute bore a "striking resemblance" to provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act
and Uniform Limited Partnership Act which limit the right of someone to gain control of
the partnership. Id. The partnership model has been described as "suppletory" in the sense
that the law permits contractual modification but attempts in the absence of contract to
supply terms that meet the expectations of the parties. M. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF
THE CORPORATION 9 (1976). The large public corporation usually has been viewed differently
because of the amount of economic power it wields. Id. at 18.In any case, the Court's analogy to partnership may indicate its recognition that corporate law is becoming more contractual. See also Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983)
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ing is no different than a contractual choice of law provision. In
either case private contracting usually is not subject to regulation
under the commerce clause.
Some commentators have argued that the corporation is merely
a "nexus of contracts," with the entity serving to facilitate contracting among its constituencies. 06 Under this view, state corporate law provides the standard legal arrangement that reduces
transaction costs of private bargaining and benefits shareholders.30
State corporate law has in fact developed from a regulatory focus
to a more enabling legal regimen that allows contractual modifications of some of its rules.3 08 Often the mechanism provided to alter
these rules is shareholder amendment to the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.30 9 This does not mean, however, that corporate
law should be viewed as purely an issue of contract. This contractual model has been criticized as inappropriate in public corporations in which the shareholders are widely dispersed and are incapable of real bargaining over the terms of the contract.3 10
When a firm incorporates, the parties arguably are choosing that
state's laws to govern the internal affairs of the corporation.3 1 ' This
is similar to contractual choice of law provisions.3 12 This choice,
According to the majority "[Edgar v. MITE Corp.], of course, did not involve the fiduciary
obligations of a contractual nature imposed by state law." Id. at 5 n.3.
306. Fischel, supra note 75, at 917-18.
307. R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1978).
308. See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BusINEss CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1970); R. WINTER, supra note 307.
309. E.g., Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1985).
The statute permits the shareholders to amend the certificate to limit director liability in
duty of care cases.
310. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Clarke, Agency Cost Versus FiduciaryDuties, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusiNEsS 55 (1984).
311. One can accept this view without having to accept the contract model for corporations. Courts should be wary of using the commerce clause to adopt a theory of the firm that
is controversial and not clearly accepted by the states. As the Court in CTS Corp. indicated,
"[t]he Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory." CTS Corp, 107 S. Ct. at 1651. In a sense, the more contractual the law becomes, the
less regulatory it appears and thus the commerce clause appears to be implicated to a lesser
degree. Yet the choice of the state to make the law more contractual than regulatory reflects
a state interest in the extent of regulation it views as valid.
312. In Hart v. General Motors Corp., 129 A.D.2d 179, 517 N.Y.S. 2d 490 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987), the court in dismissing a derivative suit against a Delaware corporation on forum non
conveniens grounds stated:
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however, does not necessarily mean that a state's corporate law
does not involve governmental interests. 31 3 Otherwise, much of
state corporate law would be immune from scrutiny under the
commerce clause.3 14 Given the strong statement of the role of the
state and its interest in its corporations in the Court's opinion in
CTS Corp., courts should continue to scrutinize these statutes and
other corporate law on commerce clause grounds. They should use
the internal affairs doctrine in balancing under the commerce
clause as opposed to complete acceptance of the notion of private
contracting.
Even if a court views the act of incorporating as similar to a private contractual choice, the law of the state of incorporation will
not automatically apply to all its corporations. A contractual
choice of law is subject to another state's law when the chosen law

In incorporating in a particular State, shareholders, for their own particular
reasons, determine the body of law that will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation and the conduct of their directors. Delaware is obviously a state in
which, for various reasons, many businesses choose to incorporate. The corporation and its shareholders rightfully expect that the laws under which they
have chosen to do business will be applied. For choice of law purposes, the
decision of shareholders to incorporate under the law of one jurisdiction is no
different from designating the law governing a business trust, which prima facie determines the applicable law.
Id. at 184-85, 517 N.Y.S. 2d at 493 (citation omitted). See also Rogers v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933). The Court indicated, "When, by acquisition of his stock, plaintiff
became a member of the corporation, he, like every other shareholder, impliedly agreed that
in respect of its internal affairs the company was to be governed by the laws of the State in
which it was organized." Id. at 130.
313. Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent in Shaffer v. Heitner that because a corporation is the creature of the state, actions that impact on the management of the corporation, whose powers and duties are defined by state law, implicate the state's public policy.
433 U.S. 186, 224 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). In Moran, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated, "The fact that
directors of a corporation act pursuant to a state statute provides an insufficient nexus to
the state for them to be state action which may violate the Commerce Clause or Supremacy
Clause." Id. at 1353.
314. For example, if a state enacted a statute under its corporate law that required corporations incorporated in that state to remain incorporated in that state, would that law be
constitutional because the corporation contractually chose that state? In Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit indicated that
"statutes requiringbusiness operations to be performed in the home state that could more
efficiently be performed elsewhere impose a burden on commerce that is per se illegal." 577
F.2d 1256, 1282 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original), rev'd sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, on remand, 602 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979).
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runs contrary to a fundamental policy of the state concerning the
applicable law.3 15 Thus the fourth-generation statutes are not necessarily inapplicable under choice of law principles. If a state has
significant interests dictating that its law should apply, then, notwithstanding the private choice and consistent with conflict of law
principles, its law will apply. Thus, in most cases of conflict, the
law of incorporation presumptively will prevail unless stronger governmental interests of another state can rebut the presumption.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court in CTS Corp. was correct in finding the Indiana statute constitutional. The courts should be wary of invalidating any
of the other state takeover statutes. The use of the Williams Act to
invalidate state corporate law without a stronger showing of congressional intent or a direct interference from its provisions seems
inappropriate. Although Congress could federalize corporate law, it
has been reluctant to do so. The states traditionally have regulated
corporate law, and Congress has chosen to preempt that law only
in limited and explicit circumstances.
Of course, states are not free to preclude access to the corporation or its shares. Under the rationale of CTS Corp., resident and
nonresident shareholders must have equal access within the time
frames of the Williams Act. Corporate law need not provide the
offeror with an unregulated access, however. The policy underlying
the Williams Act is investor protection. If state regulation focuses
directly on the shareholders and facilitates their decisionmaking,
then it furthers the Williams Act's goals. Even if a statute places
power in the board of directors, that regulation is not inconsistent
with those goals given the traditional role of the states in establishing the rules of corporate governance. A strong showing that state

315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971). In Greenspun v. Lindley, the court left open the question whether the explicit choice of Massachusetts law in the trust agreement in that case would not allow another state's law to apply. 36
N.Y.2d 473, 478, 330 N.E.2d 79, 81, 369 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126 (1975). The fourth-generation
statutes are not necessarily more difficult to avoid than the other corporate statutes that use
the state of incorporation. A corporation can decide to reincorporate or opt out of the statute if it wants to avoid the law of the incorporating state. A corporation can also avoid the
law of most of the fourth-generation statutes because of the right to opt out of the statutes.
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regulation interferes with investor protection will be required
before that regulation will be preempted.
The use of the commerce clause to invalidate state corporate law
has also been restricted by the opinion in CTS Corp. State corporate law appears to have a strong presumption in its favor because
of the state's role in the creation of corporations and the relationships within the corporation. This is a significant interest that
should be presumptively valid when balanced against the burdens
to interstate commerce. The commerce clause should not be used
to resolve the debate over what constitutes investor protection.
The state of incorporation, however, may not have the only interest in its corporations when a particular corporation has a significant relationship with another state. The courts should not use
the commerce clause to mandate the internal affairs doctrine,
which applies the law of the state of incorporation. Instead, when
regulations are inconsistent the courts should consider another
state's interest by balancing the benefits with the burdens on interstate commerce. Given the strong interest of the state of incorporation in corporate internal affairs, the nonincorporating state
must overcome the burden on interstate commerce of not applying
the internal affairs doctrine. Thus, the law of the state of incorporation usually will apply. In certain circumstances, however, a significant local presence may be sufficient to allow another state to
regulate.
The Supreme Court has accepted a role for the states in the
market for corporate control and has limited the use of the Constitution to protect that market. Although the market for corporate
control provides some benefits, so does state corporate law. The
debate over the roles of this market and of the states in the protection of investors, the concerns for other interests within the corporate community, and the overall societal impact of hostile takeovers remain controversial. The resolution of this debate belongs in
Congress, 310 in the state legislatures, and in the capital markets.

316. Following the decision in CTS Corp., Congress has entertained conflicting proposals
both to preempt state law on takeovers and to explicitly permit it. Robb, SEC Faces Doubt
On Takeover Plan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1987, at 41.

